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Innovations in the War on Tax Evasion
Tracy A. Kaye*
ABSTRACT
Offshore tax evasion is a global problem that requires a global
solution. Nevertheless, the United States unilaterally responded to
the offshore tax evasion problem by enacting the Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act. FATCA requires foreign banks to report
information about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers directly
to the Internal Revenue Service and imposes a thirty percent
withholding tax on certain U.S. payments to any bank that will not
cooperate. Yet, U.S. banks were not required to report any
information on nonresident account holders (except for Canadians)
to anyone.
FATCA garnered worldwide attention. The European Union
expressed its concerns to the U.S. Treasury about the compliance
burden on the financial industry and the conflict with EU Member
States’ laws on privacy and data protection. Treasury is resolving
these issues by negotiating bilateral agreements known as
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that will require reciprocity
on the part of the United States in the exchange of information.
These IGAs are furthering the movement toward global transparency
as most FATCA partner jurisdictions intend to require reporting on
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Center. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the PwC Inaugural Lecture hosted by
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all nonresident accounts rather than just U.S. accounts. This could
lead to the development of a multilateral platform for the exchange
of information that is critical to combating offshore tax evasion.
This Article urges the United States to adopt the regulations and
legislation that are necessary before the United States can provide its
FATCA partners with the same information that they have been
asked to give the U.S. government. The United States should play a
leadership role in furthering global transparency and take the steps
required to no longer function as a tax haven for tax evaders from
other countries. The IGA with Mexico that entered into force on
January 1, 2013, is an appropriate vehicle for the United States to
demonstrate this renewed commitment to the exchange of
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Offshore tax evasion is a global problem. 1 It requires a global
solution. Nevertheless, the United States chose a unilateral response
to the offshore tax evasion problem that could no longer be ignored
after the Swiss bank UBS scandal. The Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) was enacted in 2010 as part of the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act 2 and essentially enlists
foreign financial institutions to report directly to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) certain information about financial accounts
held by U.S. taxpayers or by foreign entities in which U.S. taxpayers
hold a substantial ownership interest. 3 Failure to do so will result in a
withholding tax on a variety of payments from the United States to
these nonparticipating financial institutions. 4
This garnered worldwide attention. A letter from the European
Union to the IRS and U.S. Treasury expressed concerns about the
1. A report by the Tax Justice Network estimates between $21 trillion to $32 trillion
of unreported private financial wealth was held offshore by wealthy individuals at the end of
2010. See James S. Henry, The Price of Offshore Revisited, TAX JUST. NETWORK, 36 (July, 5
2012),
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf. The
Tax Justice Network is an independent organization that focuses on the harmful effects of tax
evasion, tax competition, and tax havens. About Tax Justice Network, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK,
http://www.taxjustice.net/about/who-we-are/goals/.
2. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501–35,
124 Stat. 71, 97–115 (2010) [hereinafter HIRE Act].
3. See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012).
4. See I.R.C. § 1471(a) (2012).
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compliance burden on the EU financial industry and the potential
conflict with the various EU Member States’ laws on privacy and
data protection. 5 The European Union Savings Directive took effect
in the Member States in 2005 and inter alia enables Member States’
tax administrations to automatically exchange information on an
individual’s interest income. 6 Given the European Unions’ initiatives
in information exchange, the European Commission had hopes of
negotiating an EU-wide accommodation.
In a speech on January 24, 2012, before the New York State Bar
Association, Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary McMahon
acknowledged that some countries face legal impediments to
complying with the requirement to report account holder
information directly to the IRS. 7 For example, the German Banking
Industry Committee pointed out several areas of potential legal
conflicts such as national data protection laws conflicting with
FATCA requirements and national public and/or civil laws
conflicting with the requirements to terminate certain customer
relationships. 8 Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary McMahon
observed that foreign governments had previously revised their laws
to accommodate the Qualified Intermediary program but stated that
the Treasury was exploring an intergovernmental approach to
address this problem. 9
On February 8, 2012, the Treasury Department issued a joint
statement announcing that it was negotiating agreements with the
5. See Annex to Letter from European Union to U.S. Treasury, IRS on Impact of
FATCA on European Financial Service Industry, 11 TaxCore No. 67, Apr. 7, 2011; see also
Joe Kirwin, EU Letter to IRS, Treasury Raises Concerns over Impact of FATCA on Financial
Services, BNA Daily Tax Rep., March 24, 2011, No. 57, at I-2; see also Press Release,
European Comm’n., Taxation: EU/US Dialogue on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act (Apr. 06, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-413_en.htm
(confirming letter).
6. Council Directive 2003/48, on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest
Payments, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38, 43, 45 [hereinafter Savings Directive] (regarding the
taxation of savings income).
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks by Acting Assistant Secretary Emily
McMahon at the NY State Bar Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1399.aspx
[hereinafter
McMahon Remarks].
8. Letter from German Banking Industry Committee to U.S. Dep’t of Treasury at 4
(May
10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/DcomUnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/us_tax_GBIC_100511_122011.pdf.
9. McMahon Remarks, supra note 7. See infra Part IV (discussion of Qualified
Intermediary Program).

365

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/14/2014 4:14 PM

2014

United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain that would
allow their financial institutions to provide the required U.S. account
holder information to their own governments with reciprocal
automatic information exchange between governments. 10 Despite
the movement toward “transnational tax information exchange
networks,” 11 the United States chose to resolve any issues that arise
in the implementation of FATCA through bilateral agreements
known as Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs). 12 This continues
the ad hoc approach, “reciprocal bargaining in the national interest”
that characterizes international tax regulation, but does remove some
of the criticisms regarding the extraterritoriality of the FATCA
legislation. 13 Furthermore, as evidenced by the OECD and EU
reactions, the initial unilateral action of the United States appears to
be having a snowball effect, forcing countries and international
organizations to deal more expeditiously with the offshore tax
evasion problem than otherwise would have occurred and will
hopefully lead to a multilateral platform for the exchange of
information.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II traces
the evolution of FATCA and explores its ramifications and the
international response to its requirements. Part III focuses on one
specific consequence of FATCA: the finalization of regulations on
the reporting of nonresident alien bank deposit interest. Part IV
provides some background on previous tax compliance programs,
such as the Qualified Intermediary Program and the Offshore
Volunteer Disclosure Program, including discussion of the respective
failures and successes. Part V discusses the European Union’s
initiatives with respect to information exchange and the impact of
FATCA on these initiatives. Part VI highlights some proposals to

10. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the U.S., Fr., Ger., It.,
Spain and the U.K. Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving Int’l Tax
Compliance
and
Implementing
FATCA
(Feb.
8,
2012),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releas
es/documents/020712%20Treasury%20IRS%20FATCA%20Joint%20Statement.pdf.
11. Miranda Stewart, Transnational Tax Information Exchange Networks: Steps towards
a Globalized, Legitimate Tax Administration, 4 WORLD TAX J. 152, 153 (2012).
12. For example, the United States could have worked through the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. See Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing
Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 371–72 (2012).
13. Stewart, supra note 11, at 155 (citing J. BRAITHWAITE & P. DRAHOS, GLOBAL
BUSINESS REGULATION (2000)).
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further the movement toward global transparency and a multilateral
platform for the exchange of information as well as the role that the
United States should play.
II. FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT
One of the most important innovations in the U.S. war on
offshore tax evasion is the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA), which added Sections 1471 to 1474 to the Internal
Revenue Code in 2010. 14 FATCA requires U.S. taxpayers holding
financial assets with an aggregate value exceeding $50,000 offshore
to report those assets to the IRS beginning with their 2011 tax
return. 15 Failure to report foreign financial assets will result in a
penalty of $10,000 (and a penalty up to $50,000 for continued
failure after IRS notification). 16
The Bank Secrecy Act already requires U.S. taxpayers to file a
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) on June
30th of each year that they have ownership of a foreign financial
account of more than $10,000. 17 The FBAR was intended to provide
law enforcement with information primarily to combat illegal
activities such as money laundering and expand protection against
terrorist financing. 18 However, the new form 8938 required by
FATCA is used to report the total value of all specified foreign
financial assets. 19 This is a significant expansion because it includes

14. Sections 1471 to 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. or Code) were
enacted in the “Foreign Account Tax Compliance” title (Title V) of the HIRE Act. HIRE Act,
supra note 2, at 97–115.
15. I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2012).
16. I.R.C. § 6038D(d) (2012). Underpayments of tax attributable to non-disclosed
foreign financial assets will be subject to an additional substantial understatement penalty of 40
percent. See Instructions for Form 8938, IRS, (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8938.pdf.
17. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114–24 (1970) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–59 (2012); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–22 (2012)); see also
TD F 90-22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts IRS (Jan. 2012), available at
http://bsaefiling.fincen.treas.gov/NoRegFBARFiler.html. In 2009, 543,043 FBARs were
filed. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44
CONN. L. REV. 675, 701 (2012) (citing to a 2010 TIGTA report).
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (discussing usefulness of reports in criminal and tax
proceedings as Congressional purpose); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5311(2012) (concerning
protection from international terrorism as purpose).
19. Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets, IRS (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8938.pdf.
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foreign stock or securities not held in a financial account as well as
investment vehicles, such as foreign hedge funds and foreign private
equity funds. 20 These are not required to be reported on the FBAR.
But more importantly, FATCA imposes reporting requirements
on the foreign banks where U.S. taxpayers are holding these offshore
accounts. 21 Using third parties to increase compliance with the
federal income tax has been a highly successful technique in the U.S.
system. 22 “This bill offers foreign banks a simple choice—if you wish
to access our capital markets, you have to report on U.S. account
holders,” said Rangel (then Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee), in the press release for FATCA. 23 Thus, not later than
March 31, 2015, 24 a foreign financial institution (FFI) will be
required to annually file reports directly to the IRS regarding
financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers or by foreign entities in
which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest, 25 with
respect to U.S. account information for calendar year 2014.
FATCA requires that foreign financial institutions enter into
agreements with the IRS that obligate the “participating” FFI to
perform identification and due diligence procedures concerning
account holders. 26 There is a different level of diligence expected
with respect to individual accounts and entity accounts and between
new and preexisting accounts. 27 It is expected that FFIs that comply
with the due diligence guidelines will be deemed compliant with the
requirement to identify U.S. accounts and not held to the strict
liability standard.

20. This includes foreign partnership interests. See Instructions for Form 8938, supra
note 16, at 4.
21. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1) (2012).
22. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2008).
23. Lee A. Sheppard, Getting Serious About Offshore Evasion, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 399,
402 (2009).
24. The final regulations phase in implementation of the reporting requirements. See
Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and
Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign
Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, 5877 (2013) [hereinafter FATCA Preamble]. These dates were
further amended by 78 Fed. Reg. 55202, 55203 (2013).
25. I.R.C. § 1473(2)(A) defines a substantial U.S. owner as a person owning an interest
greater than 10 percent directly or indirectly.
26. See I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(A), (B) (2012).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(c) (2012).
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The enforcement mechanism is that the participating FFIs agree
to withhold thirty percent of U.S.-source income paid to (a)
nonparticipating FFIs (known as passthru payments), 28 (b) individual
account holders who fail to provide sufficient information to
determine whether they are a U.S. person, 29 or (c) foreign entity
account holders who fail to provide sufficient information about the
identity of its substantial U.S. owners. 30 Approximately four hundred
pages of proposed regulations interpreting FATCA were released in
February 2012. 31 This guidance did contain an exception from the
withholding requirement for local FFIs where at least ninety-eight
percent of their accounts are held by residents of the country in
which the FFI is organized. 32
The IRS held a public hearing with respect to this guidance on
May 15, 2012, where financial industry representatives expressed
concerns over the complexity and pleaded for the IRS to simplify the
regulations and to delay various effective dates. 33 Witnesses
representing both foreign and domestic financial institutions as well
as investment funds “focused their testimony primarily on
documentation burdens, modifying effective dates, conflicts with
local law, and the regs’ [sic] overall complexity.” 34 There was a
“sharp demand for IRS to conform its account identification and
documentation requirements to the . . . rules that foreign banks
already have in place[.]” 35 Representatives from “countries ranging

28. See I.R.C. § 1471(a); see also I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i); I.R.C. § 1471(d)(7)
(defining “passthru” payments as any withholding payment).
29. See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(6) (specifying that an account holder who fails to provide
information sufficient to determine whether the account is a U.S. account is a recalcitrant
account holder).
30. Id.
31. See Internal Revenue Service, Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by
Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial
Institutions
and
Other
Foreign
Entities,
(Feb.
8,
2012),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/reg-121647-10.pdf.
32. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(f)(1)(i)(A)(5), 77 Fed. Reg. at 9090; see also Wesley
Elmore & Kristen A. Parillo, Proposed FATCA Regulations Explained, 134 TAX NOTES 1069,
1070 (2012).
33. See Shamik Trivedi, Bank Representatives Seek Delay of FATCA Regs, 66 TAX NOTES
INT’L 695 (2012).
34. Id. at 695.
35. Alison Bennett, Financial Institutions: Witnesses Urge IRS to Give Banks More Time
to Comply with FATCA, Air Many Concerns, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 16, 2012, at GG-1.
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from Australia to Japan” expressed the “universal message: Give us
more time.” 36
In response to the growing concern over the looming deadlines,
the IRS has twice announced later implementation dates for the due
diligence and documentation procedures as well as the reporting
requirements under FATCA. 37 The new timelines aligned the
regulatory guidance for U.S. withholding agents and FFIs in
countries without IGAs with the deadlines specified in the IGAs.
Financial institutions were also given more time to implement system
changes. 38 The proposed regulations were finalized on January 17,
2013, and coordinate the regulatory obligations of financial
institutions with those found in the various intergovernmental
agreements. 39 For example, the amended final regulations delay the
effective date of the FFI agreement until April 25, 2014, for those
participating FFIs that have received a global intermediary
identification number. 40 Adopting a risk-based approach to
implementing the statute, the final regulations grandfather all
obligations outstanding on July 1, 2014 from withholding and
expand the categories of FFIs that are deemed compliant without
having to enter into an agreement with the IRS. 41 Accounts
outstanding as of June 30, 2014, are treated as pre-existing
accounts. 42
The final regulations also provide a transition rule for a FFI if it
has one or more branches that cannot satisfy the obligations of the
FFI agreement because those branches are operating in jurisdictions

36. Id.
37. Timeline for Due Diligence and Other Requirements Under FATCA,
Announcement 2012-42, 2012-47 Internal Revenue Bull. 561 (Nov. 19, 2012); Revised
Timeline and Other Guidance Regarding the Implementation of FATCA, Notice 2013-43,
2013-31 Internal Revenue Bull. 113, 114 (July 29, 2013). See also Jaime Arora, New FATCA
Timelines Increase Conformity Between Regs, IGAs, 137 TAX NOTES 470 (2012).
38. Diane Freda, IRS Coordinates Due Diligence Timelines for Requirements Related to
FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 25, 2012, at G-3.
39. See Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions
and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign
Entities, 78 Fed. Reg. 5874, (Jan. 28, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301); see also
FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5882.
40. FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5882; see also Notice 2013-43, supra note 37,
at 114.
41. FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5876; see also Notice 2013-43, supra note 37,
at 114.
42. Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, at 114.
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with legal restrictions impeding FATCA compliance. 43 If the FFI
otherwise satisfies the requirements of a participating FFI, it will be
allowed to become a participating FFI until December 31, 2015. 44
This deadline “puts pressure on FFIs to encourage other countries to
sign IGAs” 45 because signing an IGA with the United States is the
most efficient way to overcome any legal impediments to FATCA
implementation.
FATCA provisions apply to “withholdable” payments made after
June 30, 2014. 46 The term “withholdable payment” includes any
payment of U.S. source fixed or determinable (FDAP) income and
any gross proceeds from sales or dispositions of property capable of
producing U.S. source FDAP income. However, the term excludes
certain payments, such as effectively connected income and ordinary
course of business payments. 47 Beginning July 1, 2014, the
withholding requirements will apply to FDAP payments. 48 After
December 31, 2016, withholding will also apply to gross proceeds
from the sale or disposition of any property capable of producing
U.S. source FDAP income. 49 Finally, withholding will eventually
include “some foreign passthrough payments, derivatives that give
rise to dividend equivalent payments, and obligations to make a
payment regarding collateral posted on a notional principal
contract.” 50

43. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(2)(i) (2013); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.14714(e)(2)(iii).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(2). There is a similar rule for “limited affiliates.” See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(e)(3).
45. Marie Sapirie, The Intersection of FATCA and IGAs, 138 TAX NOTES 405, 406
(2013).
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2(a)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5911–12 (mandating 30 percent
withholding of any “withholdable payment” unless excepted by an exemption or treated as a
grandfathered obligation by § 1.1471-2(b)). Notice 2013-43 announced the IRS’s intent to
amend the regulations. Notice 2013-43, supra note 37, at 113.
47. See I.R.C. § 1473(a) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1473-1(a), 78 Fed. Reg. at
5981.
48. See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2(a)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at
5911–12.
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1473-1(a)(1)(ii), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5981. Note that IGAs do not
require withholding on gross proceeds. Arora, supra note 37, at 471; see also Patrick TempleWest, IRS Delays Key Start Dates For Global Tax Evasion Law, REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/24/us-usa-tax-fatca-idUSBRE89N1PS20121024
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
50. Arora, supra note 37, at 471; see also I.R.S. Announcement 2012-42, supra note 37.
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FFIs entering into an agreement with the IRS are required to
report certain information regarding their U.S. accounts, but the
extent of the information requested is implemented in phases. 51 The
initial reporting requirements of 2014 have been extended to March
31, 2015, and mandate only identifying information, such as name,
address, account number, and TIN, as well as the balance of the
account for calendar year 2014. 52 Beginning in 2016, the aggregate
amount of interest and dividends paid or credited to depository and
custodial accounts in calendar year 2015 must be reported. 53 Finally,
in 2017 “full reporting” is required to include information on gross
proceeds from broker transactions in calendar year 2016. 54
The same day that the proposed regulations were released, the
Treasury Department also released a joint statement with the United
Kingdom, French, German, Italian, and Spanish governments
regarding an intergovernmental approach that would allow the
financial institutions of these countries to report the required
FATCA information to their own governments. The respective
government would then transmit the data to the IRS (Treasury
Model I). 55 The framework for the intergovernmental approach
would include elimination of the obligation of the FFI to negotiate a
separate agreement with the IRS. 56 Treasury officials stressed that
these IGAs are solely an alternative approach to obtaining the
information required by FATCA, not an exception to the statute. 57
The European Commissioner of Taxation has stated that the goal is
to develop a Model Agreement that could be used by all of the
Member States and ultimately lead to automatic information
exchange between countries. 58

51. See I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(1), 78 Fed. Reg. at
5951.
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(7)(ii)(A), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5955; see also Notice 201343, supra note 37, at 115 (limited reporting of identifying information with respect to calendar
year 2014).
53. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(7)(ii)(B), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5955; see also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1471-4(d)(4)(iv), 78 Fed. Reg. at 5953.
54. See FATCA Preamble, supra note 24, at 5877 (respecting calendar year 2016).
55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 10.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Alison Bennett, Much Work Ahead on Information Sharing Agreements Under
FATCA, Official Says, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 21, 2012, No. 33, at G-1.
58. Alison Bennett, Semeta Says EU Member States Working Toward Uniform Model
Pacts Under FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 8, 2012, No. 88, at J-1.
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The Treasury Department is engaged in active negotiations with
more than fifty countries and jurisdictions; thus it is conceivable that
FATCA could become the worldwide standard. 59 Speaking at the
ABA Tax Section Plenary luncheon on January 26, 2013, McMahon
said, “[u]ltimately we believe that these intergovernmental
frameworks can serve as a basis for the development of a broader
system of global information exchange and the establishment of a
common intergovernmental approach to combating offshore tax
evasion.” 60
This is an extremely important development. One ramification is
that the United States realized that in order to undertake these
bilateral arrangements, it will also have to be willing to provide these
countries with information. 61 “In this regard the United States is
willing to reciprocate in collecting and exchanging on an automatic
basis information on accounts held in U.S. financial institutions by
residents of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom.” 62 Speaking on behalf of the Treasury, Assistant Secretary
McMahon stated:
[W]e recognize that bilateral solutions require reciprocity. . . .
[W]e see no principled basis on which to require that financial
institutions based in other countries collect and provide us with
information on U.S. taxpayers, if we take the position that our own
institutions should be exempt from similar requirements. To the
contrary, we believe that it will be critical to the success of our
efforts to implement FATCA that we are able to reciprocate. 63

59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, U.S. Engaging with More than 50
Jurisdictions
to
Curtail
Offshore
Tax
Evasion
(Nov.
8,
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1759.aspx; see also Jeremiah
Coder, Extensive FATCA Negotiations Underway, Treasury Announces, 137 TAX NOTES 722
(2012). It has also been reported by unofficial sources that there are ongoing negotiations with
China. Vanessa Houldner et al., US Deal on Tax Reporting Rules Eases Foreign Bank Fears,
FIN. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/31ed2cbe-527f11e1-ae2c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2448nAmph. Without cooperation from the world’s
second-largest economy, FATCA’s effectiveness may be diluted. See Patrick Temple-West, U.S.
in Talks with Dozens of Nations on Anti-tax Dodge Pacts, REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/08/us-usa-tax-havensidUSBRE8A71LY20121108 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
60. Kristen A. Parillo, Treasury Working to Expand FATCA Agreement Network, 138
TAX NOTES 568, 568 (2013).
61. See McMahon Remarks, supra note 7.
62. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 10, at 1.
63. See McMahon Remarks, supra note 7.
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In some cases, this is information that the United States did not
currently collect such as the bank deposit interest on nonresident
account holders. 64 However, at the May 2012 ABA Tax Section
meeting in Washington D.C., a Treasury official stated that “even
where agreements are negotiated that include reciprocity, this does
not necessarily mean information will be shared on an item-by-item
basis to exactly match what the United States receives from the other
country.” 65 Furthermore, “the government is working on specific
procedures to ensure information shared with other countries would
be kept secret,” checking “with other U.S. government agencies to
determine their experience with sharing information with other
countries,” as well as “consulting with other countries on their
experiences with third-party countries.” 66 According to Michael
Plowgian, an attorney-adviser in the Treasury Office of Tax Policy,
“the information will be shared only with jurisdictions where the
United States has an agreement in place.” 67
On June 21, 2012, the Treasury Department released separate
joint statements with Japan 68 and Switzerland 69 with respect to an
alternative arrangement for implementing FATCA. Treasury Model
II, as it is being referred to, retains the structure of direct reporting
by the FFIs to the IRS followed by information exchange upon
request by the governments choosing this alternative arrangement in
lieu of the automatic exchange being promised under Treasury
Model I. 70
The Japanese Joint Statement stresses a willingness to work
together to develop a common model for the automatic exchange of
64. See infra Part IV.
65. Alison Bennett, IRS, Treasury Working with Other Countries on Single Model
Agreement Under FATCA, BNA DAILY TAX REP., May 14, 2012, No. 92, at G-10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and
Japan Regarding a Framework for Intergovernmental Cooperation to Facilitate the
Implementation of FATCA and Improve International Tax Compliance (June 21, 2012),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement%20US-Japan.pdf
[hereinafter
Press
Release–Japan].
69. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and
Switzerland Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of
FATCA (June 21, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement%20US-Switzerland.pdf.
70. See Press Release–Japan, supra note 68.
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information over the medium term. 71 Japan also agrees to direct and
enable its FFIs that are not exempt or deemed compliant to register
with the IRS and comply with official guidance that will be issued by
the Japanese Financial Services Association (consistent with the
FATCA reporting and due diligence rules). 72 Like the Swiss, Japan
will accept and honor requests for U.S. account information on an
aggregate basis. 73
The United States agrees to eliminate the obligation of each
compliant Japanese FFI to: (1) enter into a separate agreement with
the IRS as long as it is registered with the IRS; (2) withhold on
foreign passthru payments; and (3) terminate accounts of recalcitrant
U.S. account holders. 74 Treasury Model II allows the FFIs to obtain
the consent of account holders so as to mitigate the legal obstacles of
Japanese laws that prevent disclosure directly to the IRS. 75 The
Treasury Department released a template for an “Agreement
between the United States of America and [FATCA Partner] for
Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA” (Treasury
Model II) in November 2012 that has since been updated. 76 Japan
and the United States issued a statement setting forth a Model II
type intergovernmental cooperation framework allowing Japanese
banks to report directly to the United States that is effective as of
June 11, 2013. 77
Treasury Model II takes into consideration the special
characteristics of the Swiss financial industry to address potential

71. See id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69, at 2.
74. See Press Release–Japan, supra note 68, at 3.
75. Id. at 2.
76. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model 2 Template, Agreement between the United States
of America and [FATCA Partner] for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of
FATCA,
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx; see Model 2 Agreement, Preexisting TIEA or DTC
(updated 11-4-2013) [hereinafter Treasury Model II].
77. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Statement of Mutual Cooperation and
Understanding between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Authorities of Japan to
Improve International Tax Compliance and to Facilitate Implementation of FATCA, (June 11,
2013)
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (FATCA-Statement-Japan-6-11-2013.pdf). “[T]he JapanU.S. arrangement appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid being called an agreement,”
which would have necessitated approval by the Japanese Diet. Kristen A. Parillo, Japan, U.S.
Release FATCA Statement, 2013 WTD 113-1 (June 12, 2013).
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legal and contractual impediments. 78 The Swiss Joint statement notes
that the Swiss government would create an exception for FFIs from
the Swiss Criminal Code that would ordinarily prevent Swiss
Companies from performing acts for a foreign State. 79 Switzerland
also agreed that it would accept and honor group requests from the
United States with respect to recalcitrant U.S. accounts on an
aggregate basis. 80
The Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement was signed on
February 14, 2013, and follows the business-to-government
reporting approach of Treasury Model II. 81 Those Swiss financial
institutions not deemed compliant must enter into an agreement
directly with the IRS and comply with the due diligence, reporting,
and withholding requirements of the FFI agreement. 82 The Enabling
Clause of Article 4 of the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement
absolves any Swiss financial institutions with FFI agreements or
registered with the IRS from any penalties under the Swiss Criminal
Code. 83 In return, the United States eliminates the withholding
requirement under FATCA for Swiss FFIs. 84 Furthermore, compliant
Swiss FFIs are not required to terminate a recalcitrant U.S. account
holder’s account 85 or impose foreign passthru payment
withholding. 86
This Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement is a major breakthrough in U.S. negotiations with Switzerland and reflects
tremendous progress in resolving the conflict between Switzerland’s
bank secrecy laws and tax transparency at least with respect to the
United States. 87 Inconsistent with the “Rubik” agreements that
78. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69, at 1.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Agreement between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation
to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA U.S.-Switz., Feb. 14, 2013 [hereinafter Swiss
FATCA Cooperation Agreement], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/ treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Switzerland-2-14-2013.pdf.
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id. at 11. Note that the Swiss Competent Authority must exchange the requested
information with the IRS within eight months from receipt of such a request. Id.
86. Id. (“The Parties are committed to work together . . . to develop a practical and
effective alternative approach to achieve the policy objectives of foreign passthru payment and
gross proceeds withholding that minimizes burden.”).
87. Missing from the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement is language found in article
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Switzerland has negotiated with Austria, Germany, and the United
Kingdom, 88 the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement with the
United States requires Swiss financial institutions to actually
exchange information on U.S. account holders with the IRS
including aggregate information on U.S. recalcitrant accounts. 89 The
U.S. Competent Authority would then be able to make a group
request for the additional information once the Protocol has entered
into force. 90 The previously negotiated Protocol to the U.S.-Swiss
Tax Convention signed in 2009 included an agreement to honor
group requests, but unfortunately, the U.S. Senate has yet to ratify
this Protocol. 91
The U.S. Treasury has also published two versions (Reciprocal
Version and Nonreciprocal Version) of a Model Intergovernmental
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA
(Treasury Model I), reflecting the government-to-government
information sharing approach. 92 In Treasury Model I, the United
States accepted the need to coordinate the FATCA reporting
obligations with other U.S. tax reporting obligations of the foreign
financial institutions to avoid duplicative reporting, and the United
States committed to working together with the FATCA partners in
5(2) of Treasury Model II on the development of common reporting and due diligence
standards as well as a common model for automatic exchange of information.
88. See infra notes 263–76 for a discussion of the “Rubik” agreements.
89. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, art. 3, at 7–8.
90. Id. art. 5, at 9–10.
91. See Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz.,
Sept. 23, 2009, S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-1 (2011); see also Kristen A. Parillo, U.S. Senator Puts
Hold on Pending Tax Treaties, 2012 WTD 5-1 (Jan. 9, 2012) (arguing that ratification delayed
because of Senator Rand Paul’s objection to the information sharing provisions of the treaty).
92. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Releases Model
Intergovernmental Agreement for Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to
Improve Offshore Tax Compliance and Reduce Burden (July 26, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1653.aspx. Treasury revised
the text of both versions of Treasury Model 1 on November 14, 2012, to reflect the texts of
the negotiated IGAs. See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to
Improve
Tax
Compliance
and
to
Implement
FATCA,
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/reciprocal.pdf [hereinafter
Treasury Model I]; see also U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Model Intergovernmental Agreement to
Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA [hereinafter Treasury Model I
Nonreciprocal
Version],
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/nonreciprocal.pdf [hereinafter Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version].
For the November 4, 2013 versions of these models, see, for example, Model 1A IGA
Reciprocal, Preexisting TIEA or DTC, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx.
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the future to “achiev[e] common reporting and due diligence
standards for financial institutions.” 93 The IGAs enter into force
either on January 1, 2013, or when notifications of completions of
necessary internal procedures are made, whichever comes later. 94 The
IGA with Mexico is the only agreement that has actually entered into
force as of January 1, 2013. 95
Countries that sign an IGA afford their financial institutions
simplified FATCA implementation procedures because these
countries (1) will be treated as compliant and not subject to the
withholding requirements, 96 (2) will not be required to close
recalcitrant accounts or to withhold tax on such accounts, 97 and (3)
will be considered participating FFIs regardless of the status of their
affiliates in other jurisdictions. 98 The FATCA partner may allow its
FFIs to choose between the due diligence procedures found in the
regulations or those provided in the agreement. 99 Other changes
include the substitution of the concept of “controlling persons” (to
be interpreted using the Recommendations of the Financial Action
Task Force) 100 for the definition of “substantial U.S. owner” found
in the proposed regulations. 101 Furthermore, the term “Financial
93. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, preamble, at 1.
94. Id., art. 7(1), at 14; see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92,
art. 7(1), at 12.
95. See Agreement Between the Department of the Treasury of the United States of
America and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to
Improve International Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex.,
art.10(1), Nov. 19, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Mexico-11-19-2012.pdf [hereinafter Mexico
IGA].
96. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 4(1), at 11.
97. Id., art. 4(2), at 11; see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92,
art. 4(2), at 10.
98. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 4(5), at 12; see also Treasury Model I
Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 4(5), at 10. Some commentators have raised
concerns about the extent of relief from the FATCA requirements and lack of enforcement
mechanism to replace the withholding requirement. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, FATCA
Intergovernmental Agreements, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 1083, 1086 (2012).
99. Mary C. Bennett et al, Treasury Opens New Chapter in FATCA Implementation,
136 TAX NOTES 1299, 1306 (2012) (citing Treasury Model I, supra note 92, annex I,(I)(C),
at 16); see also Treasury Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, annex I,(I)(C), at 14.
100. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION:
THE
FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
101. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 1(1)(nn), at 7; see also Treasury Model I
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Institution” does not include persons engaged in investing and
trading for their own accounts. 102 Finally, Treasury Model I extends
the first reporting date to September 30, 2015. 103
Under the nonreciprocal version of Treasury Model I, the IRS
will not exchange information with respect to the FATCA partner’s
residents’ accounts held in U.S. financial institutions. 104 The
nonreciprocal version could be used by foreign countries without a
tax treaty or information exchange agreement with the U.S. to
report the FATCA information to the IRS. 105 This allows
jurisdictions without a treaty relationship with the United States to
take advantage of the “intergovernmental approach to implementing
FATCA.” 106 The Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary also has
indicated that the United States would be amenable to
simultaneously signing a tax information exchange agreement or
using the Multilateral Convention on the Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters (Multilateral Convention). 107 The
Multilateral Convention is an agreement produced under the
auspices of the OECD and the Council of Europe that “provides a
legal framework to facilitate international cooperation through
multi-country exchanges of tax information and assistance.” 108 The

Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 1(1)(ii), at 7.
102. Bennett, supra note 99, at 1305; see also Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art.
1(2)(j), at 2–3; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(1)(iii),) (2012); 78 Fed. Reg. at 5966; Treasury
Model I Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 1(2)(j), at 2–3.
103. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 3(5), at 10; see also Treasury Model I
Nonreciprocal Version, supra note 92, art. 3(5), at 9.
104. Kristen A. Parillo & Shamik Trivedi, Treasury Releases First FATCA Model
Agreement, 136 TAX NOTES 482, 482 (2012).
105. Lee A. Sheppard, Eggert Provides Update on FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements,
137 TAX NOTES 472, 473 (2012) (“Eggert said the United States would not sign a reciprocal
version with countries that lacked robust protections to handle taxpayer information
confidentiality and restrict its use to tax enforcement.”).
106. Kristen A. Parillo & Jaime Arora, Intergovernmental Agreements Could Be FATCA
Reporting Vehicles, 136 TAX NOTES 987, 987 (2012).
107. Rick Mitchell, Corwin Says Lack of Information Exchange Vehicle Need Not Bar
FATCA Implementation, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 24, 2012, no. 184, at I-2.
108. See The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters—
Background, OECD, June 4, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-taxinformation/theconventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters-background.htm
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“Its objective is to enable each Party to the Convention to counter
international tax evasion and better enforce its national tax laws, while at the same time
respecting the rights of taxpayers.”).
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United States signed the Multilateral Convention in 1989, and it was
ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1991. 109
The OECD welcomed the “new model international tax
agreement designed to improve cross-border tax compliance and
boost transparency.” 110 The endorsement included hosting a briefing
session on the intergovernmental approach to FATCA where U.S.
Treasury officials as well as British, French, Italian, Spanish, and
German officials held discussions with European banks and others. 111
The OECD has pledged to work in coordination with interested
countries to adapt the Treasury Model Agreements into a “common
model for automatic exchange of information” as well as to design
common systems for reporting and performing the due diligence tests.112
This is unprecedented engagement with a single country’s tax
legislation and speaks to the global frustration with the tax evasion
problem. The OECD has already updated Article 26 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention to allow for group requests of

109. Henry Ordower, United States of America, in: Experience with and Administrative
Practice Concerning Mutual Assistance in Tax Affairs, in MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND
INFORMATION EXCHANGE 569, 579 (Amsterdam, 2010) (noting that the United States
reserved on the provisions regarding assistance for taxes of political subdivisions, collection
assistance, and service of process except by mail). The Protocol amending the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of May 27, 2010, was signed by the United
States but is not yet in force. Stafford Smiley, Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters, 3 J. CORP. TAX’N 40 (2013).
110. Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Welcomes Multilateral Efforts to Improve
International Tax Compliance and Transparency (July 26, 2012) available at
http://www.oecd.org/
newsroom/taxoecdwelcomesmultilateraleffortstoimproveinternationaltaxcomplianceandtranspa
rency.htm. In January 2010, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs created the Treaty
Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE) Group to: (1) develop efficient treaty relief
systems “to minimize administrative costs and allocate the costs to the appropriate parties;”
and (2) identify “solutions that enhance countries’ abilities to ensure proper compliance with
tax obligations, from the perspective of both source and residence countries.” Treaty Relief
and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE), OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-oftax-information/aboutthetracegroup.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). See also discussion of
TRACE proposal, infra notes 311–314 and accompanying text.
111. Lee Sheppard, United States Sells Europeans on FATCA Intergovernmental
Agreements, 136 TAX NOTES 1504, 1504 (2012); see also Parillo & Arora, supra note 106.
112. Press Release, OECD, supra note 110. The OECD has recently released two reports
on information exchange. See OECD, Keeping It Safe: The OECD Guide on the Protection of
Confidentiality of Information Exchanged for Tax Purposes (2012), available at http://www.
oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Keeping%20it%20Safe_EN_FINAL_forweb.pdf;
OECD, Automatic Exchange of Information: What It Is, How It Works, Benefits, What Remains
to
Be
Done
(2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/AEOI_FINAL_with%20cover _WEB.pdf.
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information. 113 Article 26 sets forth the international standard on
exchange of information, and new paragraph 5 includes information
exchange on request, “regardless of bank secrecy and a domestic tax
interest.” 114 Thus, signatories are precluded from refusing to provide
information solely because the information is held by a bank or a
trustee. 115
The reciprocal version of Treasury Model I “acknowledges the
need to achieve equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic information
exchange” with the FATCA partner and commits to pursue the
adoption of regulation and support of legislation that would achieve
this result. 116 The U.S. government will only entertain a reciprocal
IGA with a country where it has determined that the foreign
government has sufficient safeguards for protecting the
confidentiality of the information. 117 Thus, it was not surprising that
the first bilateral agreement based on Treasury Model I was signed
September 12, 2012, with the United Kingdom. 118 A similar IGA
113. OECD, Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and its
Commentary,
at
5.2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/120718_Article%2026-E
NG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf; see also Lee A. Sheppard, U.S. Sells FATCA IGAs to Europeans,
68 TAX NOTES INT’L 7, 7 (2012) (stating that the update “require[s] signatories to agree to
accept group information requests as ‘foreseeably relevant’ under article 26 of their treaties”).
114. Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Updates OECD Model Tax Convention to
Extend Information Requests to Groups (July 18, 2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/tax
oecdupdatesoecdmodeltaxconventiontoextendinformationrequeststogroups.htm.
115. See OECD, Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital
(2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/article26oftheoecdmodeltaxconventionon
incomeandcapital.htm (explaining that the update “make[s] it clear that a state cannot refuse a
request for information solely because it has no domestic tax interest in the information or
solely because it is held by a bank or other financial institution”).
116. Treasury Model I, supra note 92, art. 6(1), at 13.
117. See Letter from Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong., to Timothy Geithner, U.S.
Sec’y of the Treas. (July 26, 2012) (on file with author); see also Letter from Timothy
Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of the Treas., to Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong. (Sept. 11,
2012), Tax Analyst Doc 2012-19441.
118. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, United Kingdom Sign Bilateral
Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance, Combat Offshore Tax Evasion and Implement
FATCA (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1711.aspx. It should be noted however, that the UK’s “Rubik” agreement
with Switzerland, which entered into force on January 1, 2013, is inconsistent with this
commitment to fiscal transparency. See Pasquale Pistone, Exchange of Information and Rubik
Agreements: The Perspective of an EU Academic, 67 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 216, 217 (2013)
(“Rubik agreements . . . clash with the spirit of fiscal transparency.”).
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was signed with Denmark 119 and with Mexico on November 19,
2012. 120 In 2013, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, and Spain are
the major countries that have also signed such an agreement. 121
U.K. financial institutions will benefit from due diligence rules
that resemble the existing anti–money laundering rules 122 and
reporting requirements in lieu of withholding and account
termination requirements. The U.S.-U.K. FATCA Agreement also
includes a requirement that the United States grant the U.K. any
more favorable terms that it might negotiate with another country (a
most-favored-nation article). 123 Annex II, which varies from country
to country, identifies the entities and products that are exempt from
FATCA because of the perceived low risk of their use to evade U.S.
tax. 124 For example, retirement plans specifically identified in the
U.S.-U.K. Annex II “will not be subject to the FATCA due
diligence, verification, and information collection and reporting

119. See Agreement to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement
FATCA, U.S.-Den., Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-Denmark-11-19-2012.pdf.
120. See Mexico IGA, supra note 95; see also Kristen A. Parillo, U.S., Mexico Sign
FATCA Agreement, Tax Notes Today (Nov. 28, 2012); U.S.-Mexico FATCA Agreement
Entails Sharing of Taxpayer Identification Numbers, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 29, 2012, no.
229, at G-1.
121. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 11, 2014); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury, Switzerland
Sign Bilateral Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance, Combat International Tax Evasion and
Implement FATCA (February 14, 2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg1853.aspx. Serious negotiations are also underway with many
other countries such as Jamaica and Bermuda. See, e.g., Steven Jackson, Jamaica, US to Sign
Agreement on FATCA, THE GLEANER (Kingston, Jamaica), May 10, 2013, available at
http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20130510/business/business4.html; Bermuda to Sign
Model IGA 2 for USA and UK FATCA, BDA SUN (Bermuda), Apr. 20, 2013, available at
http://www.bermudasun.bm/Content/BUSINESS/Business/Article/Bermuda-to-sign-Mo
del-IGA-2-for-USA-and-UK-FATCA/72/205/65971.
122. For example, most family trusts are excluded, as these are investment entities that
are not required to apply UK anti-money laundering rules. See HM Revenue & Customs,
Implementing the UK-US FATCA Agreement: Consultation Document, ¶ 3.8–9, at 10, Sept.
18,
2012,
available
at
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/downloadFile?contentID=HMCE_PR
OD1_032308.
123. Agreement to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA,
U.S.-U.K., art. 7, Sept. 12, 2012, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-12-2012.pdf [hereinafter U.K.-U.S.
Agreement to Implement FATCA].
124. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 118.
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requirements” nor will it be subject to “FATCA withholding.” 125 In
August 2013, the U.S. Treasury Department released a revised
Model I, Annex II that uses a rules-based approach instead of lists. 126
It is expected that in the future, negotiations between the U.S.
Treasury and other countries will be much more limited, given the
details provided regarding categories of institutions and products
deemed compliant or exempt included in Model Annex II. 127
For U.S. purposes, the U.S.-U.K. FATCA Agreement is an
executive agreement that does not need to be submitted to the
Senate for approval. 128 The United Kingdom, however, will require
legislation to be put forward in the Finance Bill 2013 process. The
HM Revenue & Customs has “issued draft regulations and guidance
indicating how it will implement its obligations under its agreement
with the United States.” 129 Thus, each country that signs such an
IGA will have discretion as to how to implement it. This is cause for
concern because financial institutions may end up complying with a
multitude of requirements that vary from country to country. 130
The U.S.-U.K. Bilateral FATCA Agreement clearly specifies that
the United States will provide the relevant information with respect
to U.K. account holders using procedures to be established under
Article 27 of the U.S.-U.K. Income and Capital Gains Tax
Convention. 131 Unfortunately, there seems to be an acceptance of
the limitations on the availability of U.S. information. “While
legislative constraints in the US mean that authorities there are
unable to collect certain information, most notably with regard to
entities, they are providing the UK with a broader scope of
125. Bennett et al., supra note 99, at 1305.
126. See Treasury Model I, supra note 92, annex II, at 31.
127. Id.; see also 2013 WTD 113-1.
128. For a discussion of the controversy over the legal status of IGAs, see Allison
Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1404 (2013) (arguing
that presenting IGAs “as diplomatic agreements . . . represents a significant expansion of the
competent authority’s interpretive role”). See also response by Susan Morse, Why FATCA
Intergovernmental Agreements Bind the U.S. Government, 70 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 (2013).
129. See HM Revenue & Customs, supra note 122.
130. See generally Jaime Arora, Bank Representatives Discuss FATCA Concerns in Light of
IGAs, 2012 TAX NOTES TODAY 225-2 (Nov. 21, 2012).
131. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, art. 2(2)(b); see also
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K, art. 26, at 33–35, July 24, 2001,
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/uktreaty.pdf.
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information on individual accounts than we are providing them.” 132
However, the Agreement does contain a commitment by the U.S.
Government to support “relevant legislation to achieve such
equivalent levels of reciprocal automatic exchange.” 133
I anticipate that many countries will seek to take advantage of
the reciprocal version of Treasury Model I. 134 To the extent that
these agreements are negotiated, multilateral information exchange
will be enhanced. According to a Treasury official, most prospective
FATCA partner jurisdictions intend to require reporting on all
nonresident accounts rather than imposing “a U.S.-specific reporting
obligation.” 135 On April 9, 2013, the finance ministers of France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. agreed on a pilot multilateral
exchange facility between their countries based on their IGAs with
the United States in order to “provide a template as to the wider
multilateral agreement we hope to see in due course.” 136
The IRS is coordinating with foreign governments to standardize
the international exchange of information process. 137 As Pascal Saint
Amans, head of OECD’s center for Tax Policy and Administration,
explained, “FATCA is a big catalyst toward an [eventual] multilateral
platform for automatic information exchange.” 138 Furthermore, he
hopes that FATCA leads more countries to sign the Multilateral
Convention. 139 In fact, at an OECD conference in Cape Town,
South Africa, in October 2012, the Czech Republic, Malta, and New

132. Press Release, HM Treasury, UK-US Agreement Strengthens UK Ability to Tackle
Tax Evasion (Sept. 14, 2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-usagreement-strengthens-uk-ability-to-tackle-tax-evasion.
133. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, at art. 6; see also HM
Treasury, supra note 132.
134. See generally Jaime Arora, U.S. Treasury Official to Discuss FATCA Implementation
in Europe, Asia, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Sept. 19, 2012.
135. Marie Sapirie, Finding a Silver Lining in FATCA, 135 TAX NOTES 1551, 1552
(2012).
136. Letter from Pierre Moscovici, Wolfgang Scauble, Vittorio Grilli, Cristobal Montoro
Romero, and George Osbourne, to Algirdas Semeta, Comm’r for Taxation & Customs Union,
Audit & Anti-Fraud, Eur. Comm’n [hereinafter Finance Ministers’ Letter] (Apr. 9, 2013),
available
at
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/g5_letter_to_european_commission_090413.pdf.
137. Jaime Arora, Details on FATCA Registration Process Remains Hazy, 68 TAX NOTES
INT’L 791, 791 (2012).
138. Mitchell, supra note 107.
139. Id. “[T]he multilateral pact is definitely a piece in the patchwork of many pieces that
will go into such a platform.”
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Zealand signed the Multilateral Convention, and Lithuania, Nigeria,
Gabon, Kazakhstan, and Latvia signed letters of intent to sign the
Convention. 140 It remains to be seen, however, how much automatic
information will be exchanged on the part of the United States given
the experience discussed below with respect to the bank deposit
interest of nonresident account holders.
III. REGULATIONS ON REPORTING BANK DEPOSIT INTEREST OF
NONRESIDENTS
Certain commentators have noted that “[t]he United States is a
tax haven.” 141 The United States has negotiated tax treaties or tax
information exchange agreements with seventy-nine countries, 142 but
only has meaningful information exchange with Canada. 143 Banks
were not required to automatically report the interest payments
made to foreign persons unless the U.S. bank deposit interest was
paid to Canadian residents. 144 This resulted in de facto bank
secrecy. 145
All treaties negotiated since 1974 contain a standard tax
information exchange article, 146 but the U.S.-Canada treaty also
140. Press Release, OECD, Global Forum on Tax Transparency Welcomes New
Members
and
Reviews
12
Countries
(Oct.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/globalforum
ontaxtransparencywelcomesnewmembersandreviews12countries.htm. Further, Romania had
signed the Multilateral Convention earlier in October while Albania, Belize, Estonia, Morocco,
and Niue had also recently signed letters of intent to sign the Convention. Id.
141. Lee A. Sheppard, FATCA Is a Drone: What to Do About Compliance, 64 TAX
NOTES INT’L 10, 11 (2011) (“[An] expensive, failed war of choice, Vietnam, prompted the
United States to set itself up as a tax haven for foreign investors wanting the safety of Treasury
securities. . . . [Now] [t]he United States is a tax haven for Latin Americans. The government
will not disclose information to their governments, chiefly Mexico, and conveniently does not
have information sharing agreements with other important ones, chiefly Brazil and
Argentina.”); see also Charles Gnaedinger, U.S. Ranks First in Financial Secrecy, 56 TAX
NOTES INT’L 407, 407 (2009); David Spencer, New U.S. Regs. on Reporting Nonresident Alien
Bank Deposit Interest, 22 J. INT’L TAX’N 30, 30 (2011).
142. See Rev. Proc. 2012-24, 2012-20 I.R.B. 913 (listing seventy-nine “countries with
which the United States has in effect an income tax or other convention or bilateral agreement
relating to the exchange of tax information”).
143. Robert Goulder, How the U.S. is a Tax Haven for Mexico’s Wealthy, 55 TAX NOTES
INT’L 695, 695 (2009).
144. Id.
145. Spencer, supra note 141, at 30, 32.
146. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-11-730, Tax Administration: IRS’s
Information Exchanges with Other Countries Could Be Improved Through Better
Performance Information, App. IV (2011).
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contains an “assistance in collection” article 147 not found in the U.S.
Model Treaty. U.S. regulations implemented this treaty obligation
by requiring bank deposit interest payment information with respect
to Canadian residents to be collected and reported to the U.S.
government. 148 This information was then shared automatically with
the Canadian government. Mexico had been asking for a similar
arrangement to no avail as evidenced by the then Mexican Secretary
of Finance Agustin Carstens’ letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary
Geithner on February 9, 2009. 149 “[D]ue to the fact that the United
States does not tax interest income paid by banks to non-resident
aliens, and both countries do not have a solid and reliable
mechanism to verify actual residence of foreign depositors, we simply
are allowing both the tax avoiders and the criminals to move their
money untaxed.”
This information had not been available for any other jurisdiction
besides Canada. Under U.S. international tax law, foreign individuals
are not subject to tax in the United States on investment income
unless from sources within the United States. 150 Investment income
is defined as any payment of fixed or determinable annual or
periodical income such as interest and dividend income. 151 However,
interest earned on most deposits in U.S. banks and other financial
institutions is exempt from tax even though treated as U.S.-source
income in order to encourage foreign persons to use U.S. banks. 152
Foreign individuals do not need to have any sort of U.S. taxpayer
identification number as long as the investment earning interest “is
not effectively connected with a trade or business” in the United
147. See Sheppard, supra note 23, at 404; Revised Protocol Amending the Convention
Between the United States and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital,
U.S.-Can., Apr. 12, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-4.
148. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(a), (b)(1), 1.6049-8 (2012).
149. Letter from Agustin Carstens, Mexican Sec’y of Fin., to Timothy Geithner, U.S.
Sec’y of the Treas. (Feb. 9, 2009), Tax Analysts Doc 2009-5928 (“The exchange of
information on interest paid by banks will certainly provide us with a powerful tool to detect,
prevent and combat tax evasion . . . .”). But see infra notes 192–94 for current developments
with respect to an IGA with Mexico.
150. In general, U.S. tax is imposed at a flat rate of thirty percent on the U.S.-source
passive investment income of nonresident alien individuals. I.R.C. § 871(a) (2012). I will refer
to nonresident alien individuals as foreign individuals.
151. I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2012).
152. I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(A) (2012). Furthermore, U.S.-source interest from most debt
obligations is exempt from U.S. tax for foreign individuals pursuant to the “portfolio interest
exception.” I.R.C. § 871(h) (2012).
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States. 153 Such persons simply provide a form to the U.S. payor to
claim their exemption from domestic information reporting and
foreign-person withholding. 154 In return, with the exception of
Canada, the bank then had no obligation to issue any information to
the IRS. Thus, the government had no information to exchange with
its other treaty partners. 155
Proposed regulations issued in 2002 modified the regulations by
requiring reporting of U.S. bank deposit interest paid to residents of
fifteen countries in addition to Canada. 156 After a public hearing on
December 5, 2002, no action was taken with respect to these
regulations. On January 7, 2011, these proposed regulations were
withdrawn and replaced by new proposed regulations. 157
The 2011 proposed regulations extended “the information
reporting requirement to include bank deposit interest paid to
nonresident alien individuals who are residents of any foreign
country.” 158 The preamble to these proposed regulations noted the
“growing global consensus regarding the importance of cooperative
information exchange for tax purposes.” 159 It also noted that this
change would “further strengthen the United States exchange of
information program, consistent with adequate provisions for
reciprocity, usability, and confidentiality in respect of this
information.” 160 Finally, the expansion of the deposit interest
reporting requirement would “help to improve voluntary compliance
by U.S. taxpayers by making it more difficult to avoid the U.S.
information reporting system (such as through false claims of foreign
status).” 161

153. Spencer, supra note 141, at 32.
154. I.R.S., Form W-8BEN, Certificate of Foreign Status of Beneficial Owner for United
State Tax Withholding (2006); I.R.S., Instructions for Form W-8BEN, at 1. (2006).
155. Spencer, supra note 141, at 32.
156. See Guidance on Reporting of Deposit Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 67 Fed.
Reg. 50,386, 50,389 (Aug. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 31). These
regulations replaced proposed regulations published on January 17, 2001, proclaiming them to
be “overly broad in requiring annual information reporting with respect to U.S. bank deposit
interest paid to any nonresident alien.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 50,386–50,387.
157. See Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens, 76 Fed. Reg. 1105,
1105–1106 (Jan. 7, 2011).
158. Id. at 1106.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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On April 19, 2012, these bank deposit regulations were finalized
with some changes. 162 Starting with payments of interest not
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business made in 2013
from an account maintained at a U.S. office, 163 both U.S. and certain
non-U.S. resident accounts will be uniformly disclosed to the IRS. 164
This will facilitate “the ability of the United States to offer
cooperative, reciprocal tax information exchange arrangements” with
designated foreign tax administrations. 165
Representatives of the banking industry had called for the
withdrawal of these regulations at the public IRS hearing held on
May 18, 2011, stating that the FATCA legislation was the
appropriate vehicle to address the issue of U.S. persons establishing
foreign entities for investment in the United States. 166 The Florida
banking industry speakers predicted a massive outflow of capital to
other countries, perhaps as much as $100 billion in deposits 167 and
expressed concern that this would lead “to a weakening of bank
liquidity levels, significantly diminishing lending capacity of U.S.
banks, and the loss of many U.S. jobs.” 168 They also submitted a
letter from the entire Florida House delegation to the President
demanding withdrawal of the proposed regulations. 169 A survey done
by the Commissioner for Financial Regulation for the State of
Florida found that forty-one percent of deposits in south Florida
state-chartered commercial banks are nonresident alien deposits, of
162. T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg. 23391-01 (2012).
163. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5), 1.6049-8(a) (as amended in 2012).
164. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4, 1.6049-5, 1.6049-6 (as amended in 2012).
165. Proposed Regulations to Require Reporting of Nonresident Alien Deposit Interest
Income: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. 96 (2011) (letter from Sen. Carl Levin to Comm’r
Douglas H. Shulman) [hereinafter Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations].
166. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Public Hearing on Proposed
Regulations 26 CFR Part 31, “Guidance on Reporting Interest Paid to Nonresident Aliens”
(May 18, 2011), Tax Analysts Doc 2011-10811, at 15 (statement by Francisca Mordi, Vice
President and Sr. Tax Counsel, American Banker’s Association) [hereinafter Public Hearing
Transcript]; see also David D. Stewart, IRS Hears of Dire Consequences From Nonresident Alien
Interest Reporting, 131 TAX NOTES 783 (2011).
167. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 166, at 5 (statement by Alex Sanchez,
President, and Chief Exec. Officer, Fla. Bankers Ass’n).
168. Id. at 3 (statement by Maria Grisel Vega, Bd Member, Treasurer, Fla. Int’l Bankers
Ass’n (FIBA)).
169. See Letter from Bill Posey et al., U.S. Cong., to Barack Obama, President of the
United States (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://posey.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irsdelegationletter-march3-2011.pdf.
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which twenty-six percent of these are individual deposits.
Furthermore, ninety percent of deposits in foreign banks in south
Florida are nonresident alien deposits, of which thirty-one percent of
these are individual deposits. 170 For Latin Americans, the United
States is an “offshore” tax haven.
The speaker from the Financial Accountability and Corporate
Transparency Coalition stressed that recent agreements between
various governments have demonstrated that bank secrecy is no
longer allowable as grounds for refusing to exchange information. 171
According to Senator Carl Levin (Chairman of the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations in the U.S. Senate), the proposed
regulations would “help detect U.S. taxpayers who are evading U.S.
taxes by opening U.S. accounts and fraudulently claiming foreign
status.” 172
Senator Levin strongly recommended that the bank deposit
regulations also be made applicable to accounts opened by
corporations, trusts, or other entities that are beneficially owned by
individuals. 173 “[I]f a financial institution knows that the beneficial
owner of an account is a non-U.S. individual, the financial institution
should disclose the account to the IRS, even if the account is
nominally held in the name of a foreign entity.” 174 Unfortunately,
this recommendation was not followed in the final bank deposit
regulations even though FATCA requires foreign financial
institutions to report on accounts held by an entity where more than
ten percent is owned by a U.S. person. Thus, the bank deposit
reporting rules only apply to the nonbusiness interest on directly
held bank deposits of certain nonresident individuals. 175
Senators Levin, Grassley, Feinstein and Harkin have reintroduced
the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance
Act (S. 1465), which would, if enacted, ensure that beneficial owners
of corporations or limited liability companies are disclosed as part of

170. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 166, at 8 (statement by Thomas Cardwell,
Comm’r, State of Fla. Office of Fin. Regulation).
171. Id. at 11–12 (Statement by Rebecca Wilkins).
172. Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations, supra note 165, at 96.
173. Id. at 99.
174. Id.
175. See Lee A. Sheppard, Will U.S. Hypocrisy on Information Sharing Continue?, 138
TAX NOTES 253, 256 (2013) (“[I]n other words, the stupid rich. Because the sophisticated
rich use corporations and Delaware LLCs, they would not be affected.”).
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the incorporation process. 176 This bill requires a corporation to
provide the beneficial owner’s name, address, and a U.S. driver’s
license or passport number or the information from a non-U.S.
passport. 177 If enacted, the legislation would assist domestic law
enforcement in detecting, preventing, and punishing terrorism,
money laundering, and other misconduct involving U.S.
corporations, as well as bring the United States into compliance with
international standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering. 178
The preamble to the finalized bank deposit regulations addressed
the concerns raised that the information might be used
inappropriately. 179 Treasury stressed that information will only be
exchanged where the United States has been satisfied that the
“foreign
jurisdiction’s
legal
framework”
guarantees
the
180
Thus, the finalized
confidentiality of the taxpayer information.
bank deposit regulations only require reporting of “interest paid to a
nonresident alien individual resident in a country with which the
United States has” an information exchange agreement in force. 181
This is extremely unfortunate because from a compliance standpoint
it is easier for financial institutions to report all interest. Payors of
course, “may elect to report interest payments to all nonresident
alien individuals,” 182 but financial institutions may not feel that they
can do so unless mandated by law. As the United States is expecting
global compliance from foreign financial institutions, U.S. financial
institutions should be collecting the same information.
A revenue procedure published at the same time as the bank
deposit regulations lists the seventy-nine eligible countries and

176. See Sen. Carl Levin, Senate Floor Statement on the Introduction of the
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (Aug. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/speeches/speech/senate-floor-statement-on-theintroduction-of-the-incorporation-transparency-and-law-enforcement-assistance-act.
The
previous bill, S.1483, was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and hearings were held in the Committee on Foreign Relations on May
24, 2012. Bill Summary & Status, S. 1483, 112th Cong. (2011–2012).
177. Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th
Cong. (2013).
178. Sen. Carl Levin, supra note 176.
179. T.D. 9584, 77 Fed. Reg. at 23392.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 23393.
182. Id.
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territories that have the appropriate agreements to exchange
information by request. 183 These countries must be willing and able
to reciprocate as well as have effective confidentiality laws and
practices that ensure the use of the information only for the purposes
of administering and enforcing their own tax laws. 184 In a letter to
the Secretary of the Treasury, Congresswoman Schultz has asked for
confirmation that the IRS would not consider exchanging
information with Venezuela, a country on the list, given its inability
to meet these criteria. 185 Treasury Secretary Geithner confirmed that
regardless of the existence of an income tax treaty, 186 the IRS “will
not share tax information with another country absent a
determination that the recipient country has sufficient safeguards in
place to ensure the proper use of the information and to protect its
confidentiality.” 187 Thus, it appears that taxpayer privacy concerns
are being adequately safeguarded.
A second list in the revenue procedure details the countries with
whom the information will be shared automatically. 188 So far, only
Canada is on this second list, but the IRS has promised to provide
updates to this revenue procedure. 189 Even with such narrow
applicability of the regulatory changes, a bill passed in July, 2012, by
the House included an amendment by Rep. Bill Posey of Florida 190
that sought to delay the effective date of the regulations. 191
However, the bank deposit regulatory changes took effect in 2013.

183. Rev. Proc. 2012-24, supra note 142.
184. T.D. 9584, 2012–20 I.R.B. 902.
185. See Letter from Debbie Wasserman Schultz, U.S. Cong., to Timothy Geithner, U.S.
Sec’y of the Treas. (July 26, 2012) (on file with author).
186. The U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of Nov. 15, 2006 precludes the disclosure
of any information that “would be contrary to public policy.” U.S. Treas. Dep’t, United States
Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art. 26, para. (3)(c), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf.
187. Geithner Addresses Lawmaker’s Concerns About Security of Nonresident Aliens’
Tax Information, Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts), Doc. 2012-19441 (Sept. 19, 2012),
available at LEXIS 2012 TNT 182-12.
188. Rev. Proc. 2012-24, supra note 142.
189. Id.
190. H. Amend. 1469, Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job Creation Act, H.R.
4078, 112th Cong. (2012). Specifically, the stated purpose of the Amendment by Posey aims,
“to make it clear that the definition of significant regulatory action would include new
Treasury regulations regarding non-resident alien deposits.” Id. at Amendment Purpose.
191. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Fashion in FATCA Intergovernmental
Agreements, 136 TAX NOTES 1235, 1238 (2012).
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Thus, banks must collect information on the interest paid on certain
deposits held by nonresident alien individuals.
As discussed earlier, Mexico was the third country to sign an IGA
with the United States that will require reciprocity in information
exchange and the only country where the agreement has entered into
force as of January 1, 2013. 192 The IGA with Mexico provides that
the United States must annually exchange information on
“Reportable Accounts” on an automatic basis. 193 Under the
agreement, the United States must provide the information that is
now required to be collected under the bank deposit regulations for
2013, no later than September 30, 2015. 194 The Competent
Authorities of Mexico and the United States must establish
procedures for the automatic exchange of such information. 195 Thus,
Mexico will provide the litmus test for U.S. willingness to exchange
information. 196
FATCA reporting for the 2014 tax year will not be required until
2015, 197 so it is too early to evaluate its effectiveness. However, in
order for FATCA to work and in light of the various bilateral
arrangements being undertaken, the IRS must also be able to
cooperate with foreign tax authorities. Finalizing this bank deposit
regulation was an important but minor step in global information
sharing. It “reaffirm[s] U.S. opposition to international tax evasion,
mak[ing] it clear [that] our country is willing to do its part to stop it,
and giv[ing] moral force to U.S. efforts to convince other countries
to share information about U.S. taxpayers with the IRS.” 198 IRS
officials have nevertheless acknowledged that “U.S. rules don’t
require U.S. financial institutions to provide the exact same
192. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
193. Mexico IGA, supra note 95, at art. 2, para. 1.
194. Id. at arts. 2–3; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-4(b)(5).
195. Mexico IGA, supra note 95, at art. 3, para. 6 (“The Competent Authorities of
Mexico and the United States shall enter into an agreement under the mutual agreement
procedure provided for in Article 5 of the TIEA.”).
196. The American Bankers Association has already strongly objected to the “NRA
reporting automatic exchange provision included in the U.S.-Mexico IGA” in a letter to
Treasury Secretary Geithner on December 12, 2012. Bankers’ Group Opposes Automatic
Exchange Provision Under Mexico-U.S. FATCA Agreement, TAX NOTES TODAY (Tax Analysts)
Doc. 2012-26924 (Jan. 3, 2013), available at LEXIS 2013 TNT 2-14.
197. For practical purposes, the regulatory guidance issued has moved the actual
implementation of FATCA from 2013, as in the statute, to 2014. See FATCA Preamble, supra
note 24, at 5881.
198. Hearing on Interest Reporting Regulations, supra note 165, at 96.
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information that a foreign institution has to under FATCA.” 199 It is
also a travesty that the bank deposit regulations were knowingly
finalized with a loophole for entity accounts beneficially owned by
individuals. Thus, these interest reporting rules will suffer from the
same problems experienced by the implementation of the European
Union Savings Directive. 200
III. QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM AND OTHER TAX
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES
“[T]he United States loses moral leadership on the tax evasion
issue as long as it has an active program encouraging foreign tax
cheats to invest in the United States.” 201 Professor McIntyre is
referring to the Qualified Intermediary (QI) program that was
established in 2001 to ensure that non-U.S. investors paid the
appropriate amount of U.S. taxes on their U.S.-source investment
income. The United States imposes a statutory withholding rate of
thirty percent on U.S.-source portfolio dividends. 202 If the beneficial
owner of the dividend resides in a qualifying treaty country, this rate
can be reduced as prescribed by the treaty. 203 Thus, the banks need
to know the identity of the client in order to properly withhold. The
negotiated compromise was effectuated by obtaining QI agreements
from non-U.S. banks and other financial intermediaries that they
provide summary information regarding the treaty-based
withholding positions of their clients without disclosing the identity
of these foreign account holders. 204
A QI agreement allows a foreign financial institution to maintain
the confidentiality of its foreign direct account holders, provided
they fulfill certain withholding and information reporting
requirements. Banks not signing such QI agreements are required to

199. Andrew M. Ballard, Full Reciprocity Under FATCA Is a Work in Progress, IRS
Official Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at G-9 (Jan. 28, 2013) (statement of Ted Setzer,
manager of IRS’s Large Business & International Division).
200. See infra Part IV.A.
201. Michael J. McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX
NOTES INT’L 255, 259 (2009).
202. I.R.C. § 871 (West Supp. 2013).
203. U.S. Treas. Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15,
2006, art. 10, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf.
204. Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting, 57
VILL. L. REV. 529, 532 (2012).
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collect information from their non-U.S. customers who want a
reduced withholding rate and to remit “that information up the
chain of financial institutions and potentially all the way to the
IRS.” 205 QI status also means reduced reporting and documentation
requirements to receive the lower rate of withholding available under
an applicable treaty. As Professor Grinberg points out, this program
“provided one of the conceptual seeds for the anonymous
withholding approach currently being promoted by Switzerland as a
means to address residence country tax concerns.” 206
The QI rules define a foreign corporation as a foreign beneficial
owner. 207 This rule allows U.S. account holders to mask their
identity by making their investments through foreign
corporations. 208 The UBS scandal disclosed that some foreign banks
were advising their clients to arrange their affairs in this manner. 209
In 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged UBS, a huge
bank based in Zurich that has extensive operations in the United
States, with conspiracy to defraud the United States by enabling
their U.S. customers to mask “their ownership of, or beneficial
interest in, income and assets held through offshore accounts in
Switzerland and other jurisdictions.” 210 The DOJ argued that UBS
assisted as many as 17,000 of its American clients to evade $300
million a year in taxes through hidden offshore accounts. In order to
avoid criminal prosecution, UBS agreed to a $780 million fine. 211 In
November, 2010, the bank finalized an agreement under which the
Swiss government transferred data on approximately 4450 client
accounts allowing UBS to avoid any further action by the DOJ. 212
205. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 326.
206. Id. at 323.
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(c)(3); see also Morse, supra note 204, at 533.
208. Morse, supra note 204, at 533.
209. Id. see also J. Richard (Dick) Harvey Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of
FATCA and Its Potential Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471, 476–79 (2012) (describing the
problems with the QI system).
210. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 315.
211. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution
Agreement
(Feb.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-tax-136.html.
212. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation
on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of
America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss
Confederation, U.S.-Switz, Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irsdrop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf.
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The IRS responded in part to this scandal by launching an
amnesty program known as the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure
Program (OVDP) to encourage people with hidden offshore
accounts to come forward and get current with respect to their tax
liabilities. 213 Taxpayers who participated in the program had to
disclose the names of the bankers and others who facilitated opening
the offshore accounts and establishing shell foreign corporations. 214
In return, the taxpayers were promised that they would avoid civil
fraud charges, information return non-filing penalties, and criminal
prosecution, although they would still have to pay back taxes,
interest, and certain accuracy or delinquency penalties. 215 Interest
was so strong that a second special disclosure initiative was available
through September 9, 2011. 216 Approximately 33,000 people have
participated in these initiatives since 2009. 217 The 2009 and 2011
programs have generated collections of more than $5 billion in back
taxes, interest, and penalties. 218
The IRS announced a third version of this program in January,
2012. This program does not have a deadline for application and the
terms of the program—including increased penalties—can be altered
at any time by the Service. 219 This is in conjunction with a widening
213. See Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle
Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 502–04 (2012) for a history of voluntary
disclosure programs.
214. See IRS Releases FAQ on Voluntary Disclosure Program for Offshore Accounts, TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 7, 2009, at 86-14.
215. Id.
216. “Due to . . . Hurricane Irene, the IRS on Aug. 26 extended the due date for
offshore voluntary disclosure initiative (OVDI) requests until Sept. 9, 2011.” I.R.S., 2011
Offshore
Voluntary
Disclosure
Initiative,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=234900,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
“The first special voluntary disclosure program closed with 15,000 voluntary disclosures on
Oct. 15, 2009.” I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Second-Special-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Opens;-ThoseHiding-Assets-Offshore-Face-Aug.-31-deadline.
217. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64 (June 26, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/
IRS-Says-Offshore-Effort-Tops-$5-Billion,-Announces-NewDetails-on-the-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-and-Closing-of-Offshore-Loophole.
218. Id.; see also McMahon Remarks, supra note 7.
219. See Lee Sheppard, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Swiss Behavioral Patterns, 66 TAX NOTES
INT’L 7, 7 (2012); Marie Sapirie, IRS Announces Third Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,
134 TAX NOTES 276 (2012); I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offshore-Programs-Produce-$4.4-Billion-To-Date-forNation’s-Taxpayers;-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Reopens; see also Lederman,
supra note 213, at 517–27 for an excellent analysis of the program.

395

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

7/14/2014 4:14 PM

2014

investigation of foreign banks, including banks in Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Israel, and other foreign jurisdictions. 220 These
offshore probes by the IRS are increasing as four thousand
professionals from its Criminal Investigation division have been
stationed abroad across ten countries, with plans to expand this
international presence. 221 An increasing number of banks are turning
over client information to the United States voluntarily, by Court
order or because of Treaty obligations. Although the penalties for
the 2012 program have been raised to 27%, this is “less than the 50%
penalty that the IRS has been imposing in recent criminal tax
fraud prosecutions.” 222
The fallout of the UBS scandal continues. In the fall of 2011, the
Swiss Government ordered Credit Suisse to release certain wealthy
American clients’ account data. 223 The IRS requested, pursuant to
the 1996 United States–Switzerland Tax Convention, that the Swiss
Federal Tax Administration assist in locating U.S. account holders
that the IRS had identified, in some cases through the Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Programs. However, on April 5, 2012, the
Federal Administrative Court in Bern upheld an appeal of one of
these clients and determined that Credit Suisse did not have to
comply. 224 On July 9, 2012, the IRS filed a new more detailed treaty
request for information. 225 The IRS has also announced that
taxpayers failing to notify the DOJ of any challenges to this
220. William M. Sharp Sr., Larry R. Kemm & William T. Harrison III, The 2012 Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Program: Analysis, Insight, and Intrigue, 67 TAX NOTES INT’L 681, 684
(2012). For example, the Justice Department asked for assistance under the Liechtenstein-U.S.
Tax Information Exchange Agreement for information on undeclared accounts at the
Liechtensteinische Lanndesbanke AG on May 11, 2012. Id.; see also Laura Saunders, Israeli
ST.
J.
(June
17,
2012,
7:38
PM),
Tax
Preparers
Snared,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303410404
5
77468901036376714.html.
221. John Herzfeld, Charges Expected from Offshore Probes Outside of Switzerland, IRS
Official Says, BNA DAILY TAX REP. No. 202, at G-7 (Oct. 19, 2012).
222. Asher Rubinstein, The IRS Offensive Against Offshore Accounts: New Attacks and
New Relief, ASSETLAWYER.COM, http://www.assetlawyer.com/irs-offensive-against-offshore-a
ccounts. htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
223. David Jolly, Credit Suisse to Turn Over Data on Some U.S. Accounts,
DEALBOOK,Nov. 8, 2011, 11:31 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/creditsuisse-to-turn-over-data-on-some-u-s-accounts/.
224. David Jolly, Swiss Court Ruling Hampers a Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2012, at
B5.
225. Kristen A. Parillo & Marie Sapirie, I.R.S. Submits New Treaty Request to Switzerland
on Credit Suisse Data, 136 TAX NOTES 770 (2012).
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disclosure of tax information in foreign courts will be ineligible for
participation in the OVDP. 226
As discussed previously, Switzerland has negotiated a FATCA
Cooperation Agreement that will allow its foreign financial
institutions to report directly to the U.S. government. 227 Pursuant to
this agreement, all new U.S. accounts must consent to disclosure. 228
Furthermore, the agreement will require Switzerland to promptly
honor group information requests from the U.S. Competent
Authority based on the aggregate information reported to the
IRS. 229 Unfortunately, this requirement does not become
operational until the Swiss Protocol to the 1996 United States–
Switzerland Tax Convention that was signed on September 23,
2009, enters into force. 230 The U.S. Senate must ratify this Protocol
without further delay for the Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement
to be fully effective.
On February 2, 2012, private Swiss bank Wegelin was indicted
for conspiring to conceal more than $1.2 billion in U.S. taxpayer
funds. Many clients had moved their undeclared accounts from UBS
to Wegelin. 231 On January 3, 2013, Wegelin pled guilty in U.S.
District Court in Manhattan to assisting wealthy American taxpayers
evade taxes and will pay $74 million in restitution, fines, and
forfeiture proceeds to the United States. 232 The United States is
continuing to pressure foreign banks, bank officials, asset managers,
and attorneys. 233 The U.S. government has successfully prosecuted

226. I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-64, supra note 217.
227. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81; see also Sheppard, supra note
113, at 7.
228. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 3(1)(c); see also J.
Richard Harvey, FATCA—A Report From the Front Lines, 136 TAX NOTES 713 (2012).
229. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 5(1); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 69.
230. Swiss FATCA Cooperation Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 5(1).
231. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Swiss Bank Indicted on U.S. Tax Charges (Feb.
2, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/tax/2012/txdv12153.htm.
232. Peter Lattman, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty to Helping American Tax Dodgers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at B5. The private bank will close once these matters are settled. Chad
Bray, Swiss Bank Pleads Guilty in Probe—Wegelin & Co. Admits It Helped Americans Avoid
Taxes with Secret Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2013), at C2.
233. See Asher Rubinstein, Offshore Update: Continued Investigation and Prosecution of
Foreign Accounts Amidst a New Opportunity for Pre-emptive Disclosure, ASSETLAWYER.COM
(Jan. 19, 2012, 9:57 PM), http://www.assetlawyer.com/wordpress/?p=1170 (“Negotiations
are currently underway between the U.S. and Switzerland for a global settlement that will
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approximately fifty criminal tax evasion cases including negotiating a
$22 million payment from Mary Estelle Curran for filing false returns
and evading $668,000 in taxes on the $40 million secret bank
account left by her husband. 234 Clients are being advised to come
forward as “[i]n light of the erosion of foreign banking secrecy,
discovery of the account by the IRS is very likely.” 235 So in effect,
FATCA has already started working as the fear of bank disclosure is
encouraging taxpayers to disclose first.
IV. EUROPEAN UNION INITIATIVES
A. European Union Savings Directive
With the liberalization of capital movements, both within the
European Union and with respect to third countries, it became
necessary “to ensure a minimum level of taxation on interest
income.” 236 After years of negotiations, the Savings Directive
(“EUSD”) finally took effect in the Member States in 2005. 237
Because of certain bilateral agreements, the Directive also impacts
jurisdictions such as Jersey, Guernsey, and the Cayman Islands. 238
Equivalent measures are also applied to five European non-EU
countries: Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, and
Andorra. 239 The goal of the EUSD is to ensure effective taxation by
the beneficial owner’s state of residence of the interest payments
made to the individual from another Member State. This is enabled

involve all Swiss banks.”) [hereinafter Rubinstein].
234. Laura Saunders, U.S. is Preparing More Tax-Evasion Cases, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31,
2013), at C1.
235. Rubinstein, supra note 233. “If the banker is then criminally charged, the banker is
likely to cooperate with prosecutors and divulge bank account information as part of a
negotiated settlement. For instance, Renzo Gadola, a former UBS banker in Switzerland was
charged with facilitating US tax fraud. He pled guilty in December 2010 and has been
cooperating with DOJ prosecutors. He has provided information about U.S. clients and other
Swiss bankers who assisted in hiding foreign assets. As part of Gadola’s settlement, he must
return to the U.S. annually to further assist DOJ investigations of foreign banking.” Id.
236. Sabine Heidenbauer, The Savings Directive, in INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN TAX
LAW: DIRECT TAXATION 167, 168 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010).
237. Savings Directive, supra note 6.
238. See Jens Schroder, Savings Taxation and Banking Secrecy, in EXCHANGE OF
INFORMATION AND BANK SECRECY 59, 60 (Alexander Rust & Eric Fort eds., 2012) (the “10
dependent or associated territories of the Netherlands and the UK”).
239. Id. at 62–63.
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by the automatic exchange of information between tax
administrations on the individual’s interest income. 240
However, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Austria, instead of
exchanging information automatically, were obliged only to “levy a
withholding tax at a rate of 15% during the first three years of the
transitional period, 20% for the subsequent three years and 35%
thereafter.” 241 These “banking havens” negotiated the choice
between identifying customers or withholding tax, 242 claiming that
they would be at a competitive disadvantage unless other
jurisdictions such as Switzerland and the United States agreed to the
“exchange of information upon request as defined in the OECD
Model Agreement . . . with respect to interest payments.” 243 This
transition rule allowed Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg to apply a
“withholding tax to the savings income without having to divulge
details on individual clients or their income earned to the tax
authorities.” 244 Belgium began participating in the automatic
exchange of information as of January 1, 2010, but Austria and
Luxembourg continue to withhold at the thirty-five percent rate. 245
Luxembourg, however, has agreed to begin participating in the
automatic exchange of information within the European Union as of
January 1, 2015. 246
The Commission proposed amendments to the EUSD in 2008
in order to close loopholes and to ameliorate tax evasion. 247 The
240. Savings Directive, supra note 6, art. 1, at 39.
241. Id. art. 11, at 43. Seventy-five percent of the revenues are transferred to the
residence state of the investor. Schroder, supra note 238, at 62.
242. Sheppard, supra note 23.
243. Savings Directive, supra note 6, art. 10, at 43.
244. Charles-Henry Courtois, The Impact of the European Commission on the Council of
Ministers’ Decisions in the Field of European Taxation: The Case of the European Savings
Directive, 2 INT’L PUB. POL’Y REV., no. 2, Nov. 2006, at 33.
245. Schroder, supra note 238, at 62; see also European Commission, Rules Applicable,
(Sept.
26,
2013,
11:03
PM)),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/rules
_applicable/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
246. Ian Wishart, Luxembourg agrees to tax-exchange legislation, EUROPEANVOICE.COM
(Apr. 4, 2013), www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/luxembourg-agrees-to-taxexchange-legidlation/76912.aspx; see also European Commission Backs Luxembourg on its
Efforts to End Banking Secrecy, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 9, 2013, No. 68, at I-1.
247. Press Release, European Comm’n., Taxation of Savings: The European Commission
Proposes Changes to Eliminate Tax Evasion, (Nov. 12, 2008), IP/08/1697, available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1697.
László
Kovács,
Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, said: “The first report on the operation of the
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amendments are intended to ensure the taxation of interest payments
that are routed through intermediate tax-exempt structures such as
foreign trusts as well as to extend the scope of the Savings Directive
to other interest income from certain financial and insurance
products. 248 The Savings Directive requires that the Commission
evaluate its performance every three years. 249 The Commission’s
initial reports had found that the EUSD’s definitions of interest,
paying agent, and beneficial owner were deficient in fulfilling the
goal of effective taxation. 250 The second mandated review reported
that between the years 2000 and 2010, an average of thirty-five
percent of non-bank deposits in Member States and applicable
jurisdictions are held by untaxed offshore structures that are being
used to hide the actual beneficial owner. 251 The report also
documented a substantial increase in the sale of structured
financial products. 252
In June 2009, the EU Finance Ministers announced
recommendations agreed to by all twenty-seven Member States for
strengthening the Savings Taxation Directive. 253 In March 2011,
ECOFIN published a revised proposal that took into account
concerns expressed by various Member States as well as the opinions
of the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social

Savings Taxation Directive concluded that the Directive, although effective within the limits of
its scope, can be easily circumvented. The current scope of the Directive needs to be extended,
in order to meet our goal of stamping out tax evasion, which affects the national budgets and
creates disadvantages for the honest citizens.” Id.
248. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive
Amending Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest
Payments, at 2–3, COM (2008) 727 final (Nov. 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resour
ces/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_review/com(2008)727
_en.pdf [hereinafter Proposal for Savings Directive Amendments].
249. Savings Directive, supra note 6, at art. 18, at 45.
250. Proposal for Savings Directive Amendments, supra note 248, at 2.
251. See European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council in
Accordance with Article 18 of Council Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income
in the Form of Interest Payments, at 6–7, COM (2012) 65 final (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu
/taxation_customs/resour
ces/documents/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_review/com_2012_65_
en.pdf.
252. Id. at 10–11.
253. Charles Gnaedinger, ECOFIN Agrees on Approach to Improve Savings Tax Directive,
54 TAX NOTES INT’L 921, 922 (2009).
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Committee. 254 Discussions are ongoing. 255 In its 2012
Communication on Tax Evasion, the Commission urged the
adoption of the revisions to the Savings Directive in order to put the
EU “in a stronger position to seek equivalent improvements from
other countries.” 256
The EU leaders are trying to negotiate a tax transparency deal
that would update the Savings Directive in order to close loopholes
and to ameliorate tax evasion. The European Commission estimates
that tax evasion is costing Member States approximately one trillion
euros annually ($1.3 trillion). 257 The amendments are intended to
ensure the taxation of interest payments that are routed through
intermediate tax-exempt structures such as foreign trusts as well as to
extend the scope of the Savings Directive to other interest income
from certain financial products and insurance products. 258
The European Commission had been hoping to convince the
United States to piggyback onto its approach with respect to third
countries. Unfortunately, objections by Austria and Luxembourg
with respect to the proposed revision of the EU Savings Directive
have hindered such a result. 259 The Commission has issued a
statement applauding the “coordinated bilateral agreements” being
negotiated with the United States, noting that it could, at a later
stage, form the foundation for wider cooperation on information

254. Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Directive Amending
Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments, CNS
(2008)
(Mar.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st06/st06946.en11.pdf.
255. European Commission, First Review and Amending Proposal, (Sept. 29, 2013,
11:03
PM),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/personal_tax/savings_tax/savings_directive_
rev iew/index_en.htm.
256. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on Concrete Ways to Reinforce the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion Including in
Relation to Third Countries, at 7, COM (2012) 351 final (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter
Communication on Tax Evasion].
257. European Commission, EU gets tough on tax evasion—11/12/2012,
http://ec.europa.eu /news/economy/121211_en.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
258. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 6–7.
259. Bruce Zagaris, Bilateral Agreement Alternative to FATCA Implementation Brings
New Twist to International Tax Cooperation, 28 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 113 (2012); see
also Pistone, supra note 118, at 221 (noting that Austria and Luxembourg want to preserve
the symmetry between the Savings Directive and the external agreements to avoid any
competitive disadvantage).
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exchange between the EU and the United States. 260 The hope is that
this cooperation will lead to progress in the “EU’s efforts to promote
global application of the automatic exchange of information for tax
purposes.” 261
The Commission had asked for a mandate to allow it to
negotiate amendments to the existing savings agreements with
Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and Switzerland that
would align these agreements with the new standards for
information exchange. 262 Certain Member States—under pressure
from their prominent financial institutions—had resisted, not
wanting to further the automatic exchange of information regime. 263
Instead, Germany and the United Kingdom began their own
negotiations with Switzerland. 264 The German and British tax
cooperation agreements signed with Switzerland in 2011 (known as
the Rubik agreements) were challenged as being incompatible with
the current EU-Switzerland Savings Agreement in part because they
would have allowed a lower rate of withholding tax than the thirtyfive percent rate currently imposed and applied to interest income
already covered by the EU-Swiss Savings Agreement. 265 Germany
and the United Kingdom revised their agreements to overcome these

260. European Commission, Commission Welcomes US Move to Ensure Enhanced
International Tax Cooperation in a More Business-Friendly Way, MEMO/12/88 (Brussels,
Feb. 8, 2012); see also Bennett, supra note 58.
261. Tanguy Verhoosel, FATCA: Five EU States Work Out Compromise with Washington,
EUROPOLITICS (Feb. 09, 2012), http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/fatca-fiveeu-states-work-out-compromise-with-washington-art325662-44.html.
262. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 10.
263. See generally Kaspar Villiger, Chairman of the Board of Directors of UBS AG,
Annual General Meeting (May 3, 2012), in UBS Chair Warns Against Tax Information
Exchange Requirements, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 753, 756 (2012).
264. Francesco Carelli, The New Tax Agreement Between Switzerland and the United
Kingdom—An Analysis, 52 EUR. TAX’N 301 (June 2012).
265. Id. at 301, 305; see also Agreement Between the European Community and the
Swiss Confederation Providing for Measures Equivalent to Those Laid Down in Council
Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments,
2004 O.J. (385) 30, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?
fullText=yes&treatyTransId=567 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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objections. 266 However, not all commentators believe that all
inconsistencies have been overcome. 267
These Rubik agreements are extraordinarily complex with unique
mathematical formulas to calculate final withholdings on previously
untaxed assets in Switzerland as well as the future investment income
that they produce. 268 Germany and the United Kingdom were to
receive a guaranteed CHF 2 billion and CHF 500 million
respectively because of the untaxed assets held in Switzerland with
further payments expected to surpass CHF 4 billion and CHF 1.3
billion, an indication of the seriousness of the tax evasion problem in
Europe. 269 The Swiss-UK agreement entered into force on January
1, 2013. However, the Swiss-German agreement was rejected by the
German Bundesrat (Upper House) on November 23, 2012, as not
being compatible with Germany’s international obligations or
national policy. 270
Austria signed its own agreement with Switzerland on April 13,
2012, which entered into force on January 1, 2013. 271 Reportedly,
negotiations are also taking place with Italy, Greece, and Belgium. 272
Although intended to establish cooperation equivalent to the

266. Randall Jackson, EU Accepts Swiss Tax Agreements with Germany, U.K., 66 TAX
NOTES INT’L 314 (2012); HM Revenues & Customs, UK-Swiss Confederation Taxation
Cooperation
Agreement,
Oct.
6,
2011,
available
at
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/ukswiss.htm [hereinafter Switz-UK Agreement];
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, Ger.-Switz., Oct. 27, 2011; Protocol to the Swiss-German Agreement, Apr. 20, 2012;
Protocol
to
the
Swiss-UK
Agreement,
Mar.
20,
2012,
available
at
www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/swiss-uk-letters.pdf; see also BBC, Tax Evasion Treaty Signed by
Switzerland and Germany, (Apr. 5, 2012, 08:31 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business17624364.
267. Pistone, supra note 118, at 221–24 (asserting that the protocols to the Rubik
agreements do not resolve the problem).
268. Carelli, supra note 264, at 302–03. This payment can be avoided by authorizing full
disclosure to the UK authorities. See Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, art. 10.
269. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 10.
270. Pistone, supra note 118, at 218; see also Rolf Eicke, The Germany-Switzerland
Withholding Tax Agreement: Stalled for Good?, 68 TAX NOTES INT’L 191, (2012) (noting that
because of domestic political pressures in Germany, it appears that the agreement between
Germany and Switzerland may not be enacted).
271. See Stefanie Steiner & Christian Wimpissinger, Thoughts on the New AustriaSwitzerland Tax Agreement, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 412 (2012).
272. See Marc Quaghebeur, Switzerland and Belgium Discuss Withholding Agreement, 67
TAX NOTES INT’L 1091 (2012) (“Switzerland is also negotiating Rubik agreements with
Greece and Italy.”).
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automatic exchange of information, 273 Professor Grinberg rightly
points out that these agreements are troubling as more and more
countries relinquish their tax sovereignty. 274 Not every country will
be able to negotiate such an agreement with Switzerland, and the
terms will reflect the bargaining power of the nation. Note that
Austria was not able to negotiate any guaranteed revenues from
Switzerland.
Professor Pistone laments that the Rubik agreements harm
global fiscal transparency by reducing “cross-border flows of
information and provid[ing] a shelter for tax opacity.” 275 The
agreements provide that those individuals who close their accounts
before the expected entry into force date of January 1, 2013 will be
unaffected. 276 However, Switzerland will collect data on the
destination of funds withdrawn from the country following the
announcement of the agreement with the United Kingdom, and will
share that data—for the top ten jurisdictions that funds have moved
to as well as the number of “relevant persons” who have transferred
assets to each of the ten jurisdictions—with the United Kingdom. 277
The Liechtenstein-UK agreement provides another model for
addressing the offshore tax evasion problem, the Liechtenstein
Disclosure Facility (LDF). Since 2009, Liechtenstein has been
offering a taxpayer assistance program to UK taxpayers to help them
declare their Liechtenstein investments to HMRC. 278 Any UK
taxpayer that cannot prove that they are UK tax compliant must
participate in registration and disclosure or move their assets to
another jurisdiction. The penalties (ten percent penalty on the
underpaid liabilities) are much lower than the Offshore Voluntary

273. Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, at art. 1. The objective of this Agreement is
to exchange information about certain individuals “on an automatic basis.” Id.
274. Jurisdictions relying on anonymous withholding are placing some of their resources
in the hands of the other sovereign state. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 361. Whereas
anonymous withholding reduces policy flexibility and sovereign authority, information
reporting preserves sovereign policy autonomy. Id. at 364.
275. Pistone, supra note 118, at 217. (The Rubik agreements “clash with the spirit of
fiscal transparency and are an inappropriate way to reconcile the basic right to confidentiality
with the global effort against tax evasion.”) Id.
276. See, e.g., Carelli, supra note 264, at 302.
277. Switz-UK Agreement, supra note 266, at Art. 18.
278. See HM Revenue & Customs, Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility: Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/disclosure/liechtensteinfaq.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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Disclosure program of the United States. Other special terms include
no criminal prosecution and an option to either use a composite tax
rate of forty percent or to calculate the actual tax liability on an
annual basis. 279
Will the signing of FATCA agreements by various Member
States with the United States stem the tide of these alternative
arrangements? These single country agreements do nothing to
prevent future tax evaders from seeking to hide their assets and
income in jurisdictions with which their country has not negotiated
such an arrangement. Even current evaders do not have much of a
disincentive to move their assets to other tax haven jurisdictions to
avoid complying with the agreements. However, even Luxembourg
is negotiating an IGA with the United States that would allow it to
share information with the IRS regarding bank accounts held in
Luxembourg by U.S. citizens and residents.
As one of the largest financial centers relying on bank secrecy
laws, Luxembourg has been intensely pressured to step up
enforcement on tax evasion. As previously discussed, Luxembourg
has pledged to participate in automatic exchange of information
within the EU beginning in 2015, a move necessary if it will be
sharing information with the United States. 280 An effective FATCA
regime will put pressure on Austria to relinquish its use of the
transitional withholding rule available to it in the Savings Directive.
It is also possible that FATCA will provide the necessary impetus for
finalizing the amendments necessary to make the Savings Directive
function as it was intended. Although the EU Finance Ministers
failed to approve the Savings Directive amendments at their May
2013 meeting, they did give the Commission the mandate to
negotiate updated savings tax agreements with Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra, and San Marino. 281 As stated in the
Commission’s June 2012 Communication on Tax Evasion, “[r]ecent
developments at [the] international level as regards the US Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) open new perspectives for

279. Id.
280. Wishart, supra note 246.
281. Ian Wishart, Finance Ministers Fail to Reach Deal on Tax Avoidance,
EUROPEANVOICE.COM
(May
14,
2013),
www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/may/finance-ministers-fail-to-reach-deal-on-taxavoidance/77227.aspx. See also Press Release, Council of the European Union, Economic and
Financial Affairs (May 14, 2013), at 2.
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strengthening automatic information exchange between Member
States and third countries thus improving transparency at a global
level.” 282
B. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive
Progress toward administrative cooperation was accelerated by
the global financial crisis that highlighted the need for more effective
exchange of information to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion. 283
In February of 2009, the European Commission proposed a new
council directive on administrative cooperation in the field of
taxation, which set up procedures, scope, and conditions for the
exchange of information on request, the automatic exchange of
information, spontaneous exchange of information, and
administrative notification among Member States and between
Member States and third countries. 284 One goal was to implement
the OECD Standard on exchange of information that is set forth in
Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention. 285
After difficult negotiations, this proposal was formally adopted by
the Council in 2011 and generally became effective January 1,
2013. 286 The 2011 Exchange of Information Directive is intended to
apply to all taxes except for those specifically listed and to all
taxpayers including both natural and legal persons. 287 The 2011
Directive allows the information to be “used for the administration
and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws” as well as associated
judicial and administrative proceedings. 288 Member States must
provide the required information within certain time limits (two
months for information they already possess and six months for
other information) 289 and are obligated to provide the information
282. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 11.
283. See Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, EU and OECD Proposals for International
Tax Cooperation: A New Road?, 59 TAX NOTES INT’L 609 (2010).
284. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the
Field of Taxation, COM (2009) 29 final (Feb. 2, 2009).
285. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs
(June 9, 2009), at 23.
286. Directive 2011/16 of the Council on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of
Taxation and Repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, 2011 O.J. (L 64/1) (EU) [hereinafter 2011
Exchange of Information Directive].
287. Id. at arts. 2, 3(11).
288. Id. at art. 16.
289. Id. at art. 7(1).
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even if they do not need it for their own tax purposes and even if
held by a bank or other financial institution. 290 This means that
Member States cannot justify refusing to provide information on the
basis of their banking secrecy laws. 291 However, this provision is not
retroactive. 292
Commentators note that the articles on exchange of information
on request conceivably go beyond the OECD Standard in its
obligation to transmit any “information that is foreseeably relevant
to the administration and enforcement of the domestic [tax] laws”
because the requirements for a valid request are less onerous than
those in the OECD Model Agreement on the Exchange of
Information on Tax Matters. 293 The most important feature,
however, is the extension of the mandatory automatic exchange of
information that exists with respect to savings income to income
from employment, director’s fees, certain life insurance products,
pensions, and immovable property to the extent that information is
available. 294 Although the article prescribing the automatic exchange
of information does not take effect until January 1, 2015, it will
cover tax periods beginning January 1, 2014. 295
It is generally understood that the automatic exchange of
information is the most effective way to fight tax evasion. Thus, the
Directive provided that automatic information exchange may be
extended to other categories of income such as dividends, capital
gains, and royalties in the future. 296 The Commission is developing
computerized formats for the income covered by the 2011 Exchange
of Information Directive so that secure automatic exchange of
information can be implemented within the EU and is assessing the
efficacy of a European Tax Identification Number for taxpayers
engaged in cross-border activity. 297

290. Id. at art. 18.
291. Marius Vascega & Servaas van Thiel, Assessment of Taxes in Cross-Border Situations:
The New EU Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, 20 EC TAX REV.
148, 152 (2011).
292. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 18(3).
293. See Vascega, supra note 282, at 152–53; see also 2011 Exchange of Information
Directive, supra note 286, at arts. 1, 20.
294. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 8.
295. Id. at arts. 8, 29.
296. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 10, art. 8(5).
297. Communication on Tax Evasion, supra note 256, at 7.
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One interesting innovation in the Directive is the addition of a
most-favored-nation clause such that no Member State may refuse to
extend its wider cooperation arrangements with third countries to
another “Member State wishing to enter into such mutual wider
cooperation.” 298 One question is what effect the FATCA agreements
worked out with respect to various Member States will have with
respect to cooperation within the EU? Will the increased exchange of
information with the United States serve to accelerate the timetable
for the automatic exchange of information between the Member
States? Legally, any Member State has the right to demand from
another Member State the same level of cooperation that is being
provided to the United States. Thus, on June 12, 2013, the
Commission proposed an extension of mandatory automatic
information exchange to dividends, capital gains, other financial
income and account balances as of January 1, 2015 for information
from the 2014 tax year. 299 The Commission acknowledged that the
IGAs that many Member States have concluded or will conclude
with the United States with regard to FATCA “have given further
impetus to [automatic exchange of information] as a way of
combating tax fraud and evasion.” 300 If adopted, there will be
substantial overlap with the information required by FATCA.
The finance ministers of the EU’s five largest economies are
calling for Europe to “take a lead in promoting a global system of
automatic information exchange” by implementing the Information
Exchange Directive and effectively applying its most favored nation
clause. 301 I am hopeful that this constitutes the positive fallout from
the implementation of FATCA.

298. 2011 Exchange of Information Directive, supra note 286, at art. 19; see also
Valderrama, supra note 283, at 614.
299. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive
2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of
Taxation, at 9–10, COM (2013) 348 final (June 12, 2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/docu
ments/taxation/tax_cooperation/mutual_assistance/direct_tax_directive/com_2013_348_en.
pdf.
300. Id. at 3.
301. Finance Ministers’ Letter, supra note 136.
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V. PROPOSALS

Professor Grinberg persuasively argues that anonymous
withholding erodes sovereign policy flexibility and “institutionalizes
differentiated treatment of the most sophisticated taxpayers from the
rest of society,” thereby undermining domestic tax morale. 302 He
critiques the argument that anonymous withholding is less expensive
and more administratively feasible than automatic information
reporting, 303 given that a multilateral anonymous withholding system
following “the Swiss model must (1) . . . identify taxpayers’ country
of residence, (2) collect information about amounts of interest,
dividends, capital gains, and other income . . ., (3) determine which
financial institutions are included in the withholding system,” and
“(4) ensure financial institutions comply” with the taxpayer
identification and withholding requirements. 304 Cross-border
information reporting, on the other hand, undergirds tax morale and
strengthens the capacity to govern particularly for less powerful
sovereigns. 305 Accessible to all countries, 306 Professor Grinberg posits
that the amended Multilateral Convention 307 provides a multilateral
framework for establishing such an automatic transnational tax
information exchange. The 2010 “protocol incorporates the
internationally accepted standards for the exchange of foreseeably
relevant information regardless of bank secrecy” and requires
signatories to accept requests with respect to “ascertainable groups

302. Grinberg¸ supra note 12, at 347.
303. Id. at 351.
304. Id. at 351–52. Only the information reporting requirement for taxpayer
identification numbers (TINs) is more burdensome than anonymous withholding
requirements. Id. at 352.
305. Id. at 347.
306. Id. at 371; see also OECD, The Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in
Tax Matters—Background, June 4, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-taxinformation/the conventiononmutualadministrativeassistanceintaxmatters-background.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013). As of February 17, 2013, forty-three countries had signed the Protocol
to the Multilateral Convention. Council of Europe, Status of the Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and Amending Protocol. (Feb. 17, 2013) (EC),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=127&CM=1&DF=&CL=
ENG (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
307. Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD, pmbl., at
4
(May
27,
2010),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-taxinformation/Convention_On_Mutual_Administrative_Assistance_in_Tax_Matters_Report_and
_Explanation.pdf [hereinafter Multilateral Convention].
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or classes of persons.” 308 The Multilateral Convention also includes
provisions to facilitate automatic information exchange. 309
A blueprint for such a multilateral system would involve
“reconciling the current EU, OECD, and U.S. approaches . . . [with
respect to] routing, identification, reporting, scope, verification, and
incentives.” 310 In January 2010, the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal
Affairs created the Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement
(TRACE) Group to: (1) develop efficient treaty relief systems “to
minimize administrative costs and allocate the costs to the
appropriate parties”; and (2) identify “solutions that enhance
countries’ abilities to ensure proper compliance with tax obligations,
from the perspective of both source and residence countries.” 311 The
TRACE group issued a report on improving procedures for tax relief
for cross-border investors in 2010 312 and released an implementation
package for a standardized system for effective withholding tax relief
procedures for cross-border portfolio income in 2013. 313 Under the
OECD’s TRACE approach, financial institutions report information
annually regarding specific items of income received by investors to
the source country tax administrators who will automatically
exchange the information with the “government of the investor’s
residence country.” 314
EU financial institutions report on specific items of income
received by an EU resident to the “government where the financial
institution managing the assets resides.” 315 This taxpayer information
is then exchanged between the EU Member States pursuant to the
EU Savings Directive and the Information Exchange Directive.
308. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 371; see also Explanatory Report to the Convention as
Amended by the Protocol, Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeof-tax-information/Explanatory_Report_ENG_%2015_04_2010.pdf.
309. Multilateral Convention, supra note 307, art. 6, at 31–32.
310. Grinberg, supra note 12, at 373.
311. OECD, Treaty Relief and Compliance Enhancement (TRACE)—Implementation
Package approved by CFA, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/treatyreliefand
complianceen hancementtrace.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
312. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO
PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS: IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/44556378.pdf.
313. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TRACE IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE FOR
THE ADOPTION OF THE AUTHORISED INTERMEDIARY SYSTEM (2013).
314. Id. at 5.
315. Id.
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However, FATCA, as legislated, requires foreign financial
institutions to report directly to the United States on assets held and
income earned by U.S. persons. The IRS is evaluating the feedback
received on the TRACE project before deciding whether to adopt
any of the TRACE information exchange framework. 316
Many commentators have pointed out the conflict-of-law issues
that arise with financial institutions reporting directly to the United
States. 317 Professor Morse recommended involvement of the nonU.S. governments in the implementation of FATCA, and the
intergovernmental agreements being negotiated accomplish this
goal. 318 Treasury Model I makes available a system similar to that
used by the European Union in both the Savings Directive and
Information Exchange Directive. Treasury Model II continues the
direct bank to U.S. government reporting model but involves the
foreign governments in removing any legal impediments to their
financial institutions complying with FATCA. FATCA, as legislated,
provides the mechanism for financial institutions in countries that
did not sign an intergovernmental agreement to cooperate.
Of course, the ability to implement FATCA in three distinct
ways complicates the horizon. However, in July 2013, the G-20
finance ministers unanimously endorsed the OECD’s proposal for a
global model for multilateral automatic exchange of tax information
and committed “to automatic exchange of information as the new
global standard.” 319 This is noteworthy as the G-20 also includes
countries such as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil,
Indonesia, South Africa, and Argentina that are not members of the

316. Arora, supra note 137.
317. See, e.g., Harvey, supra note 209, at 478–79 (noting the conflict-of-laws issue with
respect to the disclosing customer information to the IRS). In a 2011 report, the Information
Reporting Program Advisory Committee cautioned the IRS that implementation of FATCA
could run afoul of foreign laws. See Internal Revenue Service, 2011 IRPAC Report:
International
Reporting
&
Withholding
Subgroup,
http://www.irs.gov/TaxProfessionals/2011-IRPAC-Report:-International-Reporting-&-Withholding-Subgroup (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“The obligations that FATCA imposes on FFIs . . . potentially conflict
with legal constraints imposed on such FFIs under foreign law in a number of respects. For
example, FATCA’s reporting requirements potentially contravene the privacy or data
protections laws of a number of jurisdictions.”).
318. Morse, supra note 204, at 542−54.
319. G20 Leaders’ Declaration, at Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders
Declaration
G20
(Sept.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://www.g20.org/news/20130906/782776427.html.
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OECD. 320 The OECD is working with the G-20 countries to
develop this new global standard for the G-20 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors’ meeting in February 2014. 321 The
Multilateral Convention would play a key role in the implementation
of the new standard.
Clearly, FATCA has served as a lever for modernizing
information exchange among governments. 322 “As old information
exchange processes evolve through initiatives like FATCA, the
automatic exchange of information is fast becoming the gold
standard.” 323 The United States must further this movement toward
global transparency by vigorously honoring the commitments made
in the intergovernmental agreements with FATCA partners to
support “relevant legislation to achieve such equivalent levels of
automatic exchange.” 324 This should include expansion of the bank
deposit regulations to entity accounts beneficially owned by
individuals as well as enactment of the Incorporation Transparency
and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465. As mentioned
previously, Senators Levin, Grassley, and others are advocating this
legislation to require states to document the beneficial owners of the
corporations. 325
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, is FATCA “a drone, an obnoxious, expensive,
arrogant, extraterritorial program likely to cause a fair amount of
collateral damage while occasionally hitting its targets” as Lee
Sheppard points out or a snowball slowly collecting participants in
the painful move toward automatic reporting? If “the endgame is a
significant expansion of transparency that will feature increased
automatic information exchange,” 326 I believe that FATCA will

320. Daniel Pruzin, OECD Secretary-General See Broad G-20 Support for Tax Initiatives,
Bloomberg Law, ITM Issue No. 135 (2013).
321. G20 Leaders’ Declaration, supra note 319.
322. Coder, supra note 59.
323. Arora, supra note 137 (citing Theodore Setzer, territory manager (international),
LB&I).
324. U.K.-U.S. Agreement to Implement FATCA, supra note 123, art. 6, at 13–14; see
also Press Release, HM Treasury, supra note 132.
325. See Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, supra notes
176– 178 and accompanying text.
326. Sapirie, supra note 135.
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accomplish this goal. I am encouraged that the OECD and EU are
seizing this opportunity to work with the United States in
developing common reporting and due diligence standards for
financial institutions.
In part, success depends on those governments negotiating
intergovernmental agreements demanding real reciprocity from the
U.S. government. The IGA with Mexico has entered into force as of
January 1, 2013 and sets forth a timeline for ever increasing items of
information to be exchanged with Mexico. This agreement is an
appropriate vehicle for the United States to demonstrate its renewed
commitment to the exchange of information. The U.S. government
must honor its promise to support the adoption of the relevant
regulations and legislation that are necessary before the United
States is able to provide its FATCA partners with the same
information that they have been asked to provide the U.S.
government. The United States should take this opportunity to be a
role model for transparency by improving the bank deposit
regulations to take into consideration entity accounts beneficially
owned by individuals as well as pursuing whatever legislation is
necessary so as to no longer function as a tax haven for tax evaders
from other countries.
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